Israel owes Trump, but that can’t mean Hamas’s survival
The president wants an end to the war in Gaza so he can make more deals in the region. As much as Jerusalem must defer to him, there must be limits to that gratitude.
By Jonathan S. Tobin
JNS
Jul 2, 2025
Put in context with his groundbreaking pro-Israel decisions during his first term, the president added to a record that eclipses the support offered by any other administration since the founding of the modern-day Jewish state in 1948. All of which means that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is obligated to Trump above and beyond the normal deference owed to Israel’s superpower ally.
A price too high?
Yet exactly how far should Netanyahu go to pay that debt when the president demands that he go along with plans that may or may not be in his country’s best interests?
It may be that in the coming days, weeks and months, the world will find out the answer to that question.
It is now being widely reported that Israel has agreed to the terms of another ceasefire-hostage release deal with the Hamas terrorists that is being pushed by the president. If leaks about America’s offer to the Islamist group are true, it will mean the release of 10 of the remaining living hostages (without being first humiliated by revolting ceremonies in which they would be forced to thank their kidnappers) and 18 bodies of deceased captives in exchange for the release of Palestinian Arab terrorists and a 60-day halt to the fighting.
If that’s all there is to it, that’s a deal that Netanyahu, who will visit Washington next week, can live with, as can most of even the far-right-wing members of his government. But as the prime minister has stated, he believes that any deal must not obligate Israel to end the war on Hamas without forcing the surrender of all remaining hostages and bodies, as well as the termination of the Islamist terror group’s rule in Gaza and the exile of all of its leaders. Should Washington force an end to the conflict without that happening, no amount of rhetoric from Trump or Netanyahu will prevent Hamas from claiming victory. And despite all the losses they have sustained since starting this war while committing unspeakable atrocities on Oct. 7, 2023, such boasts will be largely accurate.
Will the post-Oct. 7 war against Hamas end in that fashion? We don’t yet know.
In keeping with the eliminationist beliefs that have been at the core of the Palestinian national movement since its inception in the 20th century, Hamas could well refuse to accept the terms that Trump’s envoys have exchanged with them, and with Egyptian and Qatari intermediaries that have been part of the negotiations. Even if they do, their intransigence—and ideological and religious commitment to violence and the shedding of Jewish blood—could prevent any talks during the 60 days of a ceasefire from blossoming into a long-term agreement that could be represented as the end of the war.
The willingness of Hamas to postpone the achievement of its commitment to Israel’s destruction and the genocide of its population is not the only variable here. There are other factors to consider.
Pressure on Netanyahu
One is the constant domestic pressure on Netanyahu from both the families of some of the hostages and his political opponents to end the war and to achieve the release of all the captives, regardless of whether it means allowing Hamas to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.
Just as important as the back-and-forth among Israelis about whether it’s time to end the fighting without first securing the defeat of Hamas is what Trump wants out of all this. The president has openly expressed a desire to end the war in Gaza and to use that, along with the crippling of Iran and its terrorist proxies, to expand the Abraham Accords. That is the X factor in the negotiations that could well force Netanyahu to make concessions he wouldn’t otherwise be inclined to give up.
To date, Netanyahu has reiterated that he won’t allow that to happen. But if Hamas is prepared to act in accordance with its best interests as opposed to its bloodthirsty ideology and Trump demands it, would he be forced to give in?
That’s likely the assumption in Trumpworld. It’s also something that many of Netanyahu’s supporters fear.
There’s no question that the U.S. president is willing to pressure Israel, whether publicly or privately, when he thinks that it’s in his interests. His profane demand that Israeli planes be turned around before striking Iran again when Tehran violated the ceasefire is an example.
Expanding the Abraham Accords
It’s also necessary to reiterate the obvious fact that, as much as the interests of the two allies are aligned, they are not identical. Perhaps the president thinks that holding Israel back from finally finishing the job against Hamas in Gaza can lead to what he wants: an expanded Abraham Accords with, as its centerpiece, Saudi Arabia formally recognizing the State of Israel.
That’s something Netanyahu has also stated as the main goal of his diplomatic plans. If it happens, it would be a remarkable achievement considering that the desert monarchy is the guardian of Islam’s holiest places and, for the first seven decades of Israel’s existence, was the lynchpin of the Arab and Muslim world’s unflinching hostility to the existence of the Jewish state.
It also fits perfectly into Trump’s transactional vision for the Middle East, in which all nations act in their self-interest, and prioritize trade and good relations with the West while turning their backs on rogue terrorist regimes like that of Iran.
While the prospect of such a game-changing diplomatic event has been endlessly talked up by both the Trump administration and Netanyahu’s government as not merely possible but inevitable, some skepticism about this is warranted.
If, as we have every reason to believe, not only the nuclear threat but the power of Iran to create mayhem in the Middle East has been seriously degraded, that effectively removes a key incentive for the Saudis to recognize Israel.
Their shift toward a productive, albeit under-the-table relationship with Israel dates back to the Barack Obama administration’s attempt to appease Iran. Far from being motivated by the royal family’s conversion to Zionism from the extreme Wahabi strain of Islam that was the driving force behind its rise to power in the Arabian peninsula, it was fear of being left at the mercy of the Shia mullahs in Tehran that led them to reach out to the Jewish state as a military ally. The ties between Israel and the Saudis have grown since then as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s efforts to modernize his nation have moved in tandem with a decision to stop funding Islamist fundamentalists around the globe. That’s an unfortunate practice that has been taken up by Qatar, despite Trump’s embrace of that emirate as a supposed U.S. ally.
But if the Saudis now have fewer reasons to fear Iran, that also means they are bound to be less interested in full peace with Israel.
What the Saudis want
The cost-benefit analysis of normalization of relations with Jerusalem for the Saudis is not as simple as optimists about an expanded Abraham Accords like to pretend. There are real risks for the Saudis to give their seal of approval to Israel as a permanent addition to the Middle East. It goes against the Saudis’ faith and ideology, as well as the prevailing anti-Jewish sentiments of most Muslims and Arabs. That’s true even if many of their governments have come to the logical conclusion that peace with Israel is to the benefit of everyone except the Palestinian Arabs and their supporters, who still cling to fantasies about its annihilation.
The Saudis like their sideline relationship with Israel just fine since it gives them the benefits of a strategic alliance without the cost of undermining its stature as the regime most associated with Muslim legitimacy. The only thing that might tempt them to risk normalization would be if the United States were to give what they requested when Riyadh told the Biden administration in March 2023 what its price for such a move would be.
The Saudis asked for the moon. They not only wanted the United States to formally guarantee their security; they also wanted aid to start their own nuclear program. Neither request is ever likely to be granted, as Congress is unlikely to pass such a treaty, and no conceivable American administration would go along with letting them go nuclear.
Since then, the Saudis have publicly spoken about adding to their wish list by demanding that Israel agree to start a diplomatic process that could lead to the creation of a Palestinian state. Riyadh is opposed to such an outcome since another failed Arab state in the region would likely fall into the hands of Islamist fundamentalists—something not in their interests. But since Oct. 7, greater pressure has been exerted on the Saudis to at least pretend to support the Palestinians.
The administration believes the Saudis may be willing to agree to normalization without granting their extravagant requests. But that brings us back to the first step toward expanding the Abraham Accords: a deal that would end the war in Gaza.
It’s important to remember that the war aims of the Israeli government—the defeat of Hamas and the return of all of the hostages—are still mutually exclusive. As has been obvious since the terrorist invasion of southern Israel, getting all the remaining live hostages back will require Netanyahu to let Hamas survive in Gaza. He has rightly stated that means giving the terrorists the opportunity to rebuild and rearm, and to make good their pledges to commit more assaults like those that occurred on Oct. 7.
The future of Gaza and Israel
Like the wildly unrealistic plans for a state in Judea and Samaria to be given to the Palestinian Authority and its corrupt Fatah leadership, which was embraced by the Biden administration and European nations, the prospect of a withdrawal from Gaza without the eradication of Hamas is inconsistent with any idea of preserving Israeli security.
It’s also inconsistent with Trump’s vision for Gaza’s future, which, whether or not the idea of the coastal enclave being turned into a resort is possible, relies on Hamas being destroyed. That would be true of even far less grandiose schemes. No progress toward peace of any sort is imaginable until the end of the terrorist organization is secured.
That’s something that Trump—and his foreign-policy team—have periodically shown signs of understanding despite promoting ceasefire agreements with the terrorists. It is to be hoped that Trump is prepared to assure Netanyahu that Israel will be free to resume the war against Hamas if its demands for their surrender of Gaza are not met by the time the proposed 60-day halt in the war is concluded. If so, Netanyahu will likely go along with it.
However, if Trump’s appetite for putative peace deals is great enough for him to buy into the idea that there is no point in continuing the fight against Hamas, then Netanyahu will eventually be forced to make a difficult choice.
The president has reason to think Israel owes him a lot for what he has done. But that gratitude cannot take the form of agreeing to measures that are not merely antithetical to its security but the realities of its post-Oct. 7 existence. Netanyahu is loath to say “no” to Trump. Doing so could spoil an essential relationship with an irreplaceable ally, further isolate the Jewish state abroad and put him in a difficult political position at home. No one in Israel wants to find out how Trump, despite his consistent support for Israel, will react to being thwarted when he thinks a deal is on the table.
Friends of Israel have to hope it never comes to that.
Hamas may prove again to be too wedded to its insane dreams of annihilating Israel to agree to the sort of deal Trump might propose. And the president may, despite the expectations of so many of his Jewish detractors and the noises coming from him and the White House about wanting the war to end now, be too sensible ever to go along with something that will let Hamas survive. But if not, it will be up to Netanyahu to hold his ground, however difficult that might be.
No comments:
Post a Comment