Trump's message to Netanyahu revealed
No one can predict how long the war will last, but one can estimate, with high probability, when the president will say "enough." The Hamas–progressive–Qatari axis also understands this and is working to turn Israeli public opinion against the war.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer don't know. Likely Trump himself doesn't, either. The assessment is that as long as the impression is that the IDF is moving forward toward its goal, the green light from Washington will stay on. But if Trump thinks Israel's war is bogged down, stalled or pointless, one morning he will simply write on Truth Social: "Enough." That could happen in a day, a week, a month, or a quarter from now, and then the IDF tank convoys will grind to a halt.
The Hamas–Qatari–progressive axis knows this. That's why it works tirelessly through the media to make the war look futile, both to Israelis and to Western audiences. The goal is to push Trump into declaring: "Enough is enough." This already happened with the so-called "starvation campaign." In that case, Netanyahu reversed his own policies and began flooding Gaza with food just to ensure the lifeline of legitimacy from the best friend Israel ever had would keep flowing.
But there's no guarantee Netanyahu will be able to withstand the next crisis. Partly because, despite countless pleas, he hasn't built a public relations machine anything like Qatar's. That means the political hourglass is running against Israel. Sadly, Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir doesn't appear to have internalized this reality. His appointment reflects a recurring pattern in Israeli history: our most celebrated generals often display political shortsightedness.
This was true for Yitzhak Rabin with the Oslo Accords, for Ariel Sharon with the Gaza disengagement, for the retired generals who campaigned to create a Palestinian state near Kfar Saba, and for those who spent decades urging Israel to retreat from the Golan Heights, only to leave us with Syrian warlord Ahmad al-Sharaa al-Julani overlooking Tiberias. A long parade of disastrous misjudgments. To his credit, Zamir has not yet joined that list. But just six months after his widely supported appointment, it seems he too is misreading the political map.
When he assumed command in March 2025, Zamir declared: "From here our eyes are fixed in one direction - victory and the enemy's defeat! This is our mission, this is our purpose. On the enemies who sought our destruction, who slaughtered and raped, who burned and abducted - we will deliver a crushing blow. We will not rest until they are gone, and until our brothers return from the tunnels of captivity. This is our moral duty."
The words were precise. The chief of staff accurately captured what must be done to the terrorist organization that carried out the worst atrocities against Jews since the Holocaust, striking the Zionist enterprise a blow unlike any in its history. "Victory and the enemy's defeat" are indeed essential for Israel's survival. The problem is that today, Zamir is not providing a practical path for achieving those goals. His operational plan, presented to the cabinet, doesn't outline a step-by-step route to victory. That is the first flaw. The second is his failure to grasp Trump's impatience.
Like the rest of the cabinet, Zamir heard Dermer explain that if the war pauses for a temporary hostage deal, it will never resume. He also knows the explicit position of national security adviser Richard Goldberg, who now opposes a partial deal and insists: "It's all or nothing." Moreover, contrary to Zamir and other defense officials, a partial deal wouldn't halt the war for just two months, it would stall it for much longer. Even if Hamas suddenly negotiates in good faith, talks would drag on for weeks. During that time, IDF operations in Gaza City would not be at maximum force.
IDF forces in the Gaza Strip.
After that, a two-month ceasefire would leave the army needing to re-conquer areas it had vacated for the deal. That means four to five months would pass before Israel even returned to its current position. All while Trump grows increasingly impatient in the background. Does Zamir really think this leads to "victory and the enemy's defeat"? Trump himself has said plainly: "Either you play seriously, or you don't play at all."
Since the current plan won't achieve the goals, and certainly not quickly, Trump could soon conclude that Israel "isn't playing seriously." That's the path Zamir is leading Israel down. It's his political miscalculation. He doesn't seem to realize that there's no time left.
Instead of listening to defeatist pundits and armchair advisers, Zamir should think about how he wants to be remembered. Like David "Dado" Elazar, who rose from the shock of the Yom Kippur surprise attack, declared "we'll break their bones" and turned Israel's near-defeat into victory? Or like Dan Halutz, praised by the media but forever remembered as the chief of staff who sold his stock portfolio on the morning of the Second Lebanon War, and who failed to defeat Hezbollah in 2006? Right now Zamir is heading down the same road as his predecessor, Herzi Halevi.
Both scored major achievements with Operation Rising Lion - Halevi in preparing it, Zamir in executing it - but neither has succeeded in destroying the terrorist organization responsible for the greatest disaster in Israel's history: Hamas.
Master of credit-taking
The real debate between Netanyahu and his ministers on one side and Zamir and defense chiefs on the other is about public image. Zamir tells the cabinet: "If you want me to enter Gaza City and risk the hostages' lives, say so explicitly." He doesn't want to be accused by the media or hostage families of endangering the remaining 20 living hostages. He expects Netanyahu to say it clearly and back him. But Netanyahu, master of credit-taking and blame-shifting, refuses.
Even more than Zamir, the prime minister doesn't want to be branded as "the man who abandoned the hostages." He prefers any potential anger be directed at others. That's why he won't say, as minister Bezalel Smotrich have, "We must conquer Gaza, whatever the price." For Netanyahu, the cabinet's decisions and the army's operational plans speak for themselves. It was the IDF that decided not to conquer a quarter of the Strip, even though neither Netanyahu nor Defense Minister Israel Katz nor any other cabinet member gave such an order.
Netanyahu and Zamir with Gaza in the Background.
If so, the army must continue. Why should Netanyahu put himself in the political line of fire? On this point, Zamir is right. The prime minister is correct that the army chose on its own not to enter Gaza City and the central refugee camps. But there is no authority without responsibility. If the government wants the IDF to take the risks, it must back it publicly.
The chief of staff is supposed to fight and defeat the enemy, not absorb the political costs for the government or clean up after it. As for the substance, it is far from certain that advancing into areas where hostages are held actually endangers them. In fact, many freed captives have testified that when IDF tanks rumbled above their heads, their captors guarded them more closely, knowing they were their insurance policy. One hostage recounted hiding under a staircase on his captors' orders as Israeli soldiers moved through the house. He wasn't rescued, but he wasn't harmed either. Moreover, the army's estimates of hostage locations have often proven wrong.
And defining a quarter of the Strip as an area that must be avoided for fear of harming hostages sets overly broad limits. Senior Southern Command officers even suggest the opposite scenario: that a powerful Israeli offensive, making clear to the last terrorists that their fate is sealed, could break the captors' resolve. Former hostages like Eli Sharabi have already testified that Hamas fighters were collapsing under pressure. "They cry into their pillows at night," he said, shocked at the devastation of Gaza.
This week, Hamas suffered another blow with the killing of its chief propagandist, Abu Obeida. So instead of hesitation and caution, the pattern since the disengagement through October 7, Israel should strike Hamas without restraint. Captor groups might then splinter from Hamas command and cut their own deals with Israel. Imagine an IDF officer standing in Gaza City's central square and announcing: "If you protect the hostages, you'll be spared. If a hair on their heads is harmed, their captors will be killed or jailed."
That's the direction Israel must take. Ultimately, the difference between victory and failure lies in the head, the mind and willpower, not military power, which clearly favors Israel. Netanyahu has said countless times that victory is his goal, and that's what he is steering toward. Trump, as noted, backs him. Zamir has declared: "Victory and the enemy's defeat! This is our mission, this is our purpose." It's time to deliver.
No comments:
Post a Comment