'PHASE TWO' IN TRUMP'S PLAN IS STILL A STRANGE FANTASY ... HAMAS IS DISCIPLINED, FANATICAL AND MESSIANIC, AND THEIR 'TASTE OF LIFE' IS DEATH

Hamas' return of the hostages should alarm Israel

Israeli officials believed the terrorist organization would struggle to recover and return all the hostages but one. Yet the very fact that it managed to do so reveals something that should deeply trouble all of us.

 

by Amit Segal 

 

Israel Hayom

Dec 19, 2025 

 

Hamas militants carry a white bag believed to contain a body, after retrieving it from a tunnel during a search for the remains of hostages in Hamad City, Khan Younis, in southern Gaza, Tuesday, Oct. 28, 2025. 

 

A secret cabal

Let us assume that Israel had decided to destroy Coca-Cola as an organization. Five army divisions would land in Atlanta, aiming to destroy the infrastructure and leadership. What are the chances that after two years of intense fighting, with 90% of the company's top leadership eliminated and headquarters bombed, the recipe of the world's most famous drink would survive? Probably very low. The secret is closely guarded by few.

But this isn't Coca-Cola, it's Hamas. And the secret survived.

Good news sometimes leads to grim thoughts. The good news: Hamas returned all the hostages' bodies in its possession, except one. Before the deal was signed, the IDF assessed that some remains might never be returned because those who knew their locations had been killed. Yet except for Ran Gvili, who is still being searched for, all were found and returned. "Hamas isn't making a 100% effort, they're making 140%," said a senior Israeli source.

How is this possible? The dilemma intensifies in light of Sinwar's obsessive secrecy, his strict compartmentalization aimed at countering Israeli intelligence. That's why Hezbollah was informed only an hour after the October 7 massacre began. That's why the lone informant on the ground could only say, "Something's happening in the mosques, but I can't get close."

For Hamas, the hostages are nuclear weapons. The circle of those in the know was extremely limited. What are the chances they all survived to reveal the burial sites?

This also ties back to us, says a senior security official. Some people survived because they were in the know. For example, one man knew exactly which wall in the maze-like "Dror Lavan" tunnel in Rafah held Hadar Goldin. "We knew "We knew who held the information we lacked, and we acted accordingly," he said, or rather, did not act. In other cases, the IDF recovered massive data caches, such as the archive found in the bunker where Muhammad Sinwar was killed. That archive helped recover eight bodies relatively quickly.

But there is another message here, one that shows just how long the road to Hamas's destruction still is, and how "Phase Two" in Trump's plan is still a strange fantasy. Hamas is disciplined, fanatical, and messianic. Look, for example, at how long—and under what conditions—the terrorists survive underground in Rafah: with no future, no hope, no oxygen. For years, Israel thought this fanaticism could be calmed with work permits or expanded fishing zones, or that Hamas would disarm willingly. To return to the Coca-Cola metaphor: their "taste of life" is death.

Anger management protocol

There's a children's book called "What Do You Do With a Problem?" So what do you do with the problem in the polls, which mostly show that the Zionist opposition doesn't have 61 seats?

Gadi Eisenkot offered his solution this week, hinting that if such were the election results, he would work to form a minority government with the abstention of the Arab parties.

Everyone was furious. Naftali Bennett was angry, his silence since Saturday night speaks volumes. The last thing he wants is a campaign focused on Arabs instead of the ultra-Orthodox. He certainly doesn't want to be dragged again into a promise not to sit with Abbas, which would immediately become a campaign on his credibility. Avigdor Lieberman was angry, declaring he would not agree to such a government. Yair Golan was also angry, but for a different reason, he supports Ra'am being a full coalition partner.

The most surprising anger came from Abbas himself: before the formation of the "Change Government," Ra'am's leader set a rule: either we vote in favor, or we vote against. He understood well that abstention is a free gift, but voting in favor has a price. He certainly doesn't want to find himself lumped in with the other Arab parties who reject any partnership. He wants to be a legitimate partner, not a mistress.

Eisenkot has no regrets and hasn't taken back his statement. Maybe it wasn't planned, but the scenario he described has been discussed for a long time (and was even raised here three months ago). In the Change Bloc, some now believe that Netanyahu has a very high chance of forming an obstruction bloc. Being prime minister gives endless opportunities to control the national agenda. Multiply that by the expected mobilization from US President Trump, says a key source in the Change Bloc, and it becomes almost impossible to steer public attention toward a campaign about ultra-Orthodox draft dodging.

Yes, he says, there's no doubt we'll pay a price if we form a government with Arab abstention. But in the immediate elections that would follow, whatever we lose from forming that government we would gain by setting the public agenda, while Netanyahu would be an opposition member with no control. Besides, he added, why should Netanyahu set the rules of what's allowed and what isn't?

Here's the catch: Eisenkot running under Bennett might earn him the Finance Ministry (since Lieberman wants Defense and Lapid wants Foreign Affairs). More likely, he'll end up with the Education or Interior Ministry. If polls show that an alliance doesn't improve the bloc's standing, maybe it's better for him to run independently at the head of a mid-sized party, securing at least the Defense Ministry.

Such thoughts are entertaining, but the bloc has its own goals and power brokers pushing for unity. They want fewer parties, fewer conflicting directions—and ideally, fewer surprise interviews.

When he says, "Who said I'm in your bloc?" one could answer: You did, when you attended every Saturday night meeting of the opposition leaders.

True, Gantz would reply, but I came to discuss how to topple the government, not to agree that those in the room should form the next coalition. In a house meeting in Alon Shvut, Gantz explained his reasoning:
"What was the problem with the last Change Government? That it failed to address anything significant. There were good people, but everything we passed was overturned by the next government. As long as it's bloc versus bloc, this will never end. We must connect between the blocs."

Connection does not mean Gantz joining Netanyahu's government alone, he's already tried that twice in major crises. The accumulated experience from the COVID and war governments left his party with little appetite for a repeat. "We won't be Netanyahu's 61st vote, that's important to know," said MK Chili Tropper at that same meeting. "It didn't achieve what we hoped for, and both times we were the small players in a broad coalition. On October 7th there was an emergency, so it was wrong to set conditions. But hopefully, if that situation returns, there will be brave people on our side willing to do what's right for Israel. Breaking the blocs doesn't mean joining at any cost."

So, the picture becomes clearer: a potential coalition negotiation with Netanyahu alongside at least one other opposition party, aiming for a government with broad representation. Gantz gave an example of strength in unity:
"I went to Netanyahu on October 7th. He looked gray. I told him, 'I'll join an emergency government.' Then I went to Lapid, who said, 'Kick out Ben Gvir and Smotrich.' I told him, 'When we talk about unity, it's not the time to kick people out. We want to do the opposite. Come join us, and we'll isolate them.' I joined, and we succeeded. Imagine if he had come with us."

Still, it's fair to assume that Gantz's frustration with his former partners also contributes to his new strategic direction. He feels the bloc is treating him unfairly:
"Didn't Bennett bring in Kohelet? Didn't he form a government with six seats in his party? When he didn't pass the threshold, did anyone say anything? But I'm under attack from within, and I'm telling you I won't waste votes. Remember this talk, I'll end up with 40–60% more than predicted."

Delayed justice

Disclosure: Ze'ev (Z'abo) Ehrlich, who was killed last year in Lebanon, was my childhood neighbor in Ofra—only three houses down the street.

Second disclosure: 9 Iyar Street in the town that I grew up in is probably the street with the highest concentration of journalists per square meter. Were it not for that—and were it not for the fact that they knew him, his immense contribution to the IDF, and the circumstances of his death—it is possible that the attempts to smear him posthumously would have succeeded, and justice would never have come to light.

For his death last November was exactly the kind of raw material from which blood libels were, until recently, routinely manufactured. On one side, a bearded settler clutching a Bible; on the other, the soldier Gur Kehati, killed alongside him while securing the fatal patrol in which he participated—inside an ancient mosque—and who also happened to be the grandson of a well-connected veteran left-wing activist.

The claim, in short, was that Gur had been sacrificed on the altar of a settler's colonialist archaeological obsession.

The principle of "don't speak ill of the dead" was not applied to Ehrlich; instead, the rule that he was guilty until proven innocent was. One senior journalist wrote that he had "perhaps been searching for signs of the grave of an obscure rabbi," accusing him of impersonating an IDF officer and asserting that there was no difference between his case and that of an impersonator from Southern Command.

Haaretz stated as fact that "Kehati was dragged against his will into the irresponsible adventure of the senior settler." Channel 13's cameras—of course—gleefully documented the disruption of a memorial conference held in his honor, attended by members of the Kehati family.

"It is outrageous that the IDF speaks of the fine qualities of a man against whom an investigation is underway," it was declared there, despite the fact that no investigation was ever conducted against him.

Now, the facts: This week, in his initial ruling, the Military Advocate General, Itai Ofir, determined that the patrol had been scheduled in advance in order to investigate the death of Staff Sergeant Uri Nisanovich at the same location two weeks earlier. This was testified to by the patrol commander, who was seriously wounded and hospitalized for an extended period. The patrol would have taken place regardless and was operationally necessary.

Two questions now remain: why was Ehrlich attached to the patrol, and was he properly enlisted.

As for the first question, Colonel Yoav Yarom, who invited him, stated that Ze'ev's expertise was required in order to locate terrorists at the site. Dozens of officers, past and present, had relied on him—from mapping alleys in the Nablus casbah for targeted killings to locating caves in which Hamas murderers might hide. The Military Advocate General ruled that this claim could not be refuted at the criminal threshold.

What remains is the technical issue of Ehrlich not having been properly enlisted. That is irregular, but it is not the fault of the civilian—and it is, of course, entirely unrelated to the original blood libel, according to which soldiers were killed for messianic fantasies.

How much malice can one absorb? How many lies and how much incitement can be hurled at a citizen whose only sins were his place of residence and his extraordinary understanding of archaeology and history?

On tours in Samaria, Ze'ev used to tell hikers, "Be careful not to step on verses." Those of us who rushed to write against him trampled the verse: "Words of hatred surrounded me; they fought me without cause." (Psalms 109:3)