Sunday, September 24, 2017

ISRAEL MUST ENSURE THE NEXT CONFLICT WITH HEZBOLLAH ENDS IN A DECISIVE VICTORY

Israel's advanced air defenses will thwart most of Hezbollah's threats to strategic infrastructure

By Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror

Israel Hayom
September 20, 2017

On the eve of Rosh Hashanah 2017, it seems there are three main regional and global factors that Israel must consider as it forges ahead: The first is an unstable world, which apparently no longer has agreed-upon tools with which to deal with issues that arise between states.

The second is an ambiguous system of world order, in which the United States has withdrawn from its role as the world's policeman; Russia uses its military power to promote its interests in the Middle East while breaking familiar rules; and China, which is gaining economic power, is flexing its muscles and all but ignoring the U.S.

The third is a dynamic Middle East that is undergoing one of the most violent transition processes in its history. In this Middle East, Iran plays an active role and is the main beneficiary of the events of the past seven years, mostly over its support – alongside Russia – of Syrian President Bashar Assad's regime.

The combination of these conditions presents Israel with both an improved strategic situation and several real challenges. On the one hand, these changes have resulted in the fact that none of Israel's neighbors enjoy a true alliance with a superpower, as Israel has with the U.S. Russia may have spared no effort to save Assad, but it did so to demonstrate its power more than out of any sense of deep friendship, and Moscow's relations with Tehran are nothing more than a marriage of convenience.

The alliance between Israel and the United States has a different meaning, both under the current administration and under the previous one, which toward the end of its term signed a $38 billion, 10-year defense aid deal with Israel. But the U.S. is taking a step back from most parts of the world, and it is facing significant challenges with regard to North Korea and China, which demands its attention almost completely. So Israel will have to resolve the issues it faces in the region without active American involvement.

Given the events of the past few years in the Middle East, Israel is not facing the threat of regular armies near its borders. Defense theories on an "eastern front" that included the Iraqi army as well as the Syrian one, or a "worst-case scenario" detailing a simultaneous war with Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Jordan, are a thing of the past, at least for the foreseeable future.

The majority of regular armies have either faded into Middle Eastern oblivion, lost in battle or are preoccupied with burning domestic issues. Perhaps in the future a threat may manifest in a different constellation, and we must constantly think about how to prepare for it, but on the eve of Rosh Hashanah, this is not a top concern for Israel's defense officials.

The threat of Islamic State terrorism emanating from Sinai or Syria is no cause for concern. It can sting, irritate and perhaps place some Israelis here or around the world in harm's way, but at the end of the day, Israel can contain such events, as their effect on its development is minor. Even Palestinian terrorism, be it via rocket fire, terror tunnels from Gaza, stabbing or ramming attacks or even armed terrorist cells in Judea and Samaria, is not an acute problem, even if it gets slightly worse.

Israel must spare no effort to fight Palestinian and Islamic State terrorism, but it also has to keep things in the right proportion, as in most cases, it is only an annoying factor.

The two most significant threats Israel faces stem from the same thing: Iran's extreme, mainly religious, animosity that has turned into open hostility between the two nations.

One threat is potential, but existential if it is realized, namely, if Iran develops military nuclear capability. The second threat is very real as Hezbollah, Iran's proxy in Lebanon has an estimated 120,000 projectiles trained on Israel.

These threats are closely linked. Iran formed Hezbollah with the explicit goal of threatening and deterring Israel, so that Israeli decision-makers would hesitate to act against Iran when the time comes. Later, when it has a nuclear umbrella, Iran will allow the Shiite terrorist group greater freedom in its operations against Israel, based on the understanding that no one would want to confront a nuclear Iran that supports Hezbollah.

That is why Iran retains practical control over important decisions by the Shiite terrorist group, including whether it embarks on a major operation against Israel. Hezbollah is an Iranian tool, not an independent organization. In 2006, when Hezbollah independently launched the abduction of two Israeli soldiers, it led to a war that significantly crippled it, prompting Iran to greatly tighten the reins.

In dealing with each of these threats, Israel must consider both. In other words, any action against the Iranian nuclear program must see Israel brace for retaliation from Hezbollah's direction, all while preparing for the (less likely) possibility that Tehran would try to directly aid Hezbollah if the group is targeted by Israel, and may even mount a direct response against Israel.

These threats require Israel to prepare for two kinds of conflicts: one that could develop over the efforts to eliminate Iran's nuclear facilities, and one that aims to deal a debilitating blow to Hezbollah's operational capabilities and infrastructure.

The first type of confrontation will take place thousands of miles away from Israel, and the Israeli Air Force will bear the brunt of it. Its objectives will be very specific and the damage it inflicts will seek mainly to destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities, but also to underscore the price of fighting Israel. The Iranians have greatly improved their air defense capability – with Russian assistance – but Israel has also made progress in this field, thanks in part to its new F-35 fighter jets. Although the latter ability is still in its early stages, given some time it will become very significant.

The second type of confrontation will involve Hezbollah and spells a far more difficult war that will inflict great damage. Thousands of missiles will hit Israel, especially its population centers, but Israel's advanced air defenses will succeed in thwarting most of the organization's attempts to damage strategic Israeli infrastructure.

Lebanon will sustain thousands of casualties as most of Hezbollah's weapons are stored in densely populated areas. The IDF's ground forces will face a complex challenge, but they have the ability to seize southern Lebanon and critically damage Hezbollah's infrastructure. This will be a mass casualty war and we must ensure that it ends in a clear Israeli victory.

In addition, Israel must also monitor the stability of the neighboring Sunni states and Turkey's conduct, but we must keep our eye on Iran and its allies.

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