THE JEWISH STATE AT RISK

The biggest threat to Israel is not a nuclear Iran but rather a plan that pushes establishing a Palestinian state at the expense of dividing Jerusalem and withdrawing to the 1967 borders

By Maj. Gen. (ret.) Gershon Hacohen

Israel Hayom
October 8, 2017

During his visit to Washington in September and in his speech before the U.N. General Assembly, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continued to underscore the Iranian threat and place it at the center of his political efforts. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump's desire to promote a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process created an underlying link between the White House's support for Israel's demands on the Iranian-Syrian arena and what is required of Israel in the Palestinian arena.

As I see it, this link is dangerous to Israel. The greatest threat to the Jewish state's existence does not stem from the presence of Shiite militias on the Golan Heights border, nor does it stem from a nuclear Iran, which is a threat of clear military-physical dimensions, but rather from a Palestinian state established in line with the Clinton plan, which seeks the division of Jerusalem and an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders.

The Netanyahu government's decision to refrain from promoting construction in key areas such as the Givat Hamatos neighborhood in Jerusalem and the seam line running between east Jerusalem and the Beit Safafa neighborhood, reflects, in practice, the extent to which despite the change in the nature of the U.S. administration, the outline of any Israeli-Palestinian agreement continues to assume dividing Jerusalem would be the basis for any peace deal.

A critical examination of recent developments in Syria can teach us how reality changes in unpredictable ways. Only two years ago, the Israeli defense establishment believed that the erosion of the Syrian army spelled the inevitable collapse of Bashar Assad's regime, which in turn would allow Israel to reduce the IDF's order of battle. Now the defense establishment believes Assad will most likely survive the six-and-a-half-year civil war ravaging his country, and the new threats taking shape on the Israel-Syria border have prompted the defense establishment to demand a budget increase.

A study of the dynamics of this change requires a re-evaluation of the basic assumptions on which the Israeli security concept was shaped with respect to the threat a future Palestinian state could pose to Israel.

Various defense experts have argued for years that in the new warfare era, the need for strategic territorial depth has shifted in favor of a need to protect Israeli population centers on the coastline from missile warfare. But enough has been said in the press about the IDF's latest exercise in the northern sector, which focused on the threat of infiltration by Hezbollah forces into border-adjacent communities, to cast doubt on this assumption.

One must also remember that Hamas in the south and Hezbollah in the north are not the only challenges Israel faces. The rise of Shiite militias in the Syrian sector requires a reassessment of the potential threat posed by a Palestinian state. In the emerging reality, unless Israel retains control of the Jordan Valley, these militias might sneak under the international monitoring radar and reach the urban seam lines in Jerusalem, Kfar Saba and Netanya.

The 2017 concept

The Agranat Commission attributed the surprise of the 1973 Yom Kippur War to the military's erroneous operational concept. But it is impossible to develop a perception of reality and act within it without an operational concept. The lesson is not to avoid the formulation of a concept, but to be aware of the need to constantly scrutinize and adjust it.

The experts supporting an Israeli withdrawal from Judea and Samaria in the framework of the two-state solution share an almost unshakable concept that is based on three assumptions: First, the very fact that Israel would withdraw from the area, with the international community's agreement to recognize the end of the so-called occupation, would give Israel the legitimacy to defend itself; second, given a credible threat, the Israeli leadership would know how and when to order the IDF to go on the offensive across Judea and Samaria; and third, the IDF's operational and technological superiority would allow it to win within a matter of days.

Not only is this concept undermined by the changes in the nature of warfare, its validity must be re-evaluated in a reality that is liable to force Israel to simultaneously fight in more than one arena. Moreover, the international arena, too, has undergone dramatic changes since the 1993 Oslo Accords were signed. Back then, Israel and the world faced the U.S. as the only true superpower, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact collapsed in Europe, bringing an end to the threat of the Cold War, and the world seemed on its way toward an era of stability and prosperity under American hegemony.

The Arab nations were at a disadvantage, which was intensified after the American victory in Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War. American military superiority was showcased in technological dimensions as well as in terms of its ability to lead a coalition army that included Arab, Saudi and Syrian forces. Given the strategic inferiority in which the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization found itself, the road to the Oslo Accords was paved.

But times have changed. Over the years, the U.S.'s hegemonic power has weakened, while Russia has regained its role as a key international player. Small wars have erupted under the guise of different regional logic; Western Europe found itself threatened by Russia's fighting in Ukraine; and radical Islamic forces from Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria and Libya have learned that their military inferiority harbored a fighting potential that could disrupt the stability the West craves.

At the same time, something fundamental changed on the horizon of Israeli-Palestinian expectations. At the beginning of the Oslo period, there was an expectation of reciprocity in the reconciliation process. But over the years, as the cycle of violence and bloodshed continued, the expectation of Palestinian reconciliation in return for Israeli concessions was replaced in the Israeli discourse by nothing more than a necessary separation from the Palestinians, "keeping them on one side and us on the other" with each side taking care of itself.

As those supporting the separation trend became more sophisticated in their efforts to explain to the Israeli public the extent to which this separation is necessary in order to preserve Israel's Jewish and democratic nature, the more the Palestinians' bargaining power grew. After all, if withdrawing from Judea and Samaria and establishing a Palestinian state are Israeli interests, and Israel is willing to do so to preserve its future, why should the Palestinians give anything in return? As far as they are concerned, they are not bound by reciprocity. They get what they want by virtue of their national right to self-determination.

This premise increases the risk that an Israeli withdrawal from Judea and Samaria will only fuel the Palestinian resistance. In this sense, it is worth exploring whether reverting back to the 1967 borders, with minor adjustments to accommodate the larger settlement blocs – that comprise no more than 3% of Judea and Samaria – will provide Israel with the conditions to defend itself.

In addition to the security aspects, a statement by senior Fatah official Abbas Zaki, explaining why he supports the two-state solution, is worth exploring further: "The two-state solution, in my opinion, will bring about Israel's collapse. Because if they [Israel] leave Jerusalem, what would happen to all their talk about the Promised Land and the Chosen People? What of all the sacrifices they made?" he said in an interview with Lebanese television network ANB in 2009. "They gave Jerusalem a spiritual status. The Jews see Judea and Samaria as their historic dream, and if the Jews leave these places, the Zionist idea will begin to implode. Then we will be able to move forward."

Zaki has keen insight into the significance of the spiritual-Jewish dimension as a condition for the continued existence of the State of Israel. The potential for imploding that is inherent to this threat is far more dangerous than the Iranian threat, its nuclear dimensions included. National priorities, alongside the logic of the defense discourse and the trends evident in the region, mandate both an overt and covert examination and revision of existing concepts.