A fateful decision not to assassinate Hamas leader comes back to haunt Israel
After Operation Guardian of the Walls, two successive Shin Bet chiefs were of the view that Yahya Sinwar should be eliminated. Netanyahu, as well as the prime ministers who succeeded him between 2021-2022, preferred the calm after Operation Guardian of the Walls, believed that Hamas was weak, deterred, and afraid of a confrontation.
Yoav Limor
Israel Hayom
Oct 20, 2023
After Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021, the Shin Bet security agency demanded the elimination of Yahya Sinwar. Nadav Argaman, who was then the head of the organization, said that the leader of Hamas had grown into a dangerous monster, posing a strategic challenge for Israel. He argued that it was worth it for Israel to go through another round of fighting to get rid of someone who had been released in a prisoner exchange and quickly took control of Gaza, uniting the organization's military and political wings under his leadership.
In Operation Guardian of the Walls, Sinwar successfully cast himself as the defender of the Temple Mount and incited Arab Israelis to take to the streets. The conflict ended in an iconic image, with Sinwar sitting on a dusty couch in the heart of Gaza's ruins. In the next round, Argaman warned that he would return even more dangerous. He said they needed to get rid of him, and Ronen Bar, who held the same view, concurred.
But Israel's civilian leaders refused to heed this warning. Benjamin Netanyahu, as well as the prime ministers who succeeded him between 2021-2022, preferred the quiet that prevailed after the operation and believed that Hamas was weak, deterred, and afraid of a confrontation. In the subsequent rounds, directed against the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the organization remained quiet. At first glance, this seemed to be proof that Sinwar had learned his lesson, preferring calm over war, the Qatari money, and having Palestinians work in Israel over rockets
On October 7, the truth became clear: Sinwar led the biggest deception operation in Israel's history. While Mohammed Deif and Marwan Issa were responsible for the military plan that was meticulously planned and executed, Sinwar was the mastermind behind the operation, giving it the green light. Sinwar had become the most lethal terrorist leader in Israel's history, worse than Yasser Arafat, worse than Hassan Nasrallah.
Sinwar is not officially included in the operation's objectives, which deal primarily with the critical blow that Hamas would get politically and militarily. But Israel cannot end the operation without Sinwar captured – dead or alive. Not only him but also Deif and Issa. This is not about a victory image or revenge, although in their case, any revenge would be just. Having them stay in power means having Israel face a ticking timebomb.
Complete horror
One of the bitter surprises of the Hamas attack was the atrocities committed by its terrorists. We knew that this was a murderous organization, as its blood-soaked history attested. But no one expected it to become an Islamic State-like organization, and even worse. The accumulating testimonies leave no room for doubt: what happened in the Gaza Strip was an embodiment of unadulterated evil.
Part of the horrors is documented, including cases of rape, beheadings, dismemberment, and the burning of houses with their inhabitants inside, not to mention the massive kidnapping of civilians and soldiers. All this has helped Israel make it clear that Hamas is not a freedom fighter or the guardian of the Strip but an organization that has no restraints.
The shock of world leaders arises from the understanding that what happened in Israel today could happen to them tomorrow. If Hamas is not defeated in Gaza, it and its ilk will strike everywhere on the globe. Israel may label Hamas as ISIS, but the truth is that it is not a gimmick but a reality.
While Western leaders have expressed their shock openly, Arab leaders did so quietly. Publicly, they have expressed sympathy for the suffering of the Palestinians in Gaza, along with criticism of "Israeli aggression." But behind the scenes, they have encouraged Israel to defeat Hamas. They are not thinking about us, but about themselves, knowing that the Hamas-ISIS idea threatens every Arab leader and regime in the region, especially when combined with the Iranian axis of evil.
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi, who fears for his life, and Jordan's King Abdullah II, who is already grappling with constant instability in his kingdom, are at the forefront of those who hope Israel will defeat Hamas. They all pray that the IDF will win, for the alternative is much worse.
The open and covert support allows Israel to go very far this time in order to defeat Hamas. It will need to do so with an almost impossible combination of aggressiveness and wisdom. Namely, aggressiveness to defeat Hamas' military array, which has been preparing for 15 years for the IDF's entry into the Strip, and wisdom to avoid the minefields (especially in the humanitarian field) that will tarnish its international legitimacy, which is critical for the operation's success.
During his visit to this week, President Joe Biden tried to reconcile these two extremes. He gave Israel a full green light to act and prevail, but he made it clear that it must refrain from harming innocent civilians. This is not a simple challenge, given the density of the Gaza Strip and the fact that Hamas' (and Hezbollah's) entire operational logic relies on exploiting the civilian population as a human shield. Israel will need to find ways to do this, and also to develop a thick skin: the operation will come with casualties and significant criticism. Israel will need to be attentive but not flinch. Otherwise, it will play into Sinwar's hands, who is banking on that very situation.
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