Israel should not wait for Nasrallah to strike
Israel should choose the timing and theater of the conflagration, rather than let Nasrallah and his partners drag it once again into hostilities at times that are inconvenient.
By Prof. Eyal Zisser
Israel Hayom
July 30, 2023
Hezbollah leader Nasrallah
In Tehran, Beirut, and in Gaza, Israel's
enemies are gleefully watching what's happening here. They are
convinced that their generations-long vision of destroying Israel is now
finally becoming a reality right beneath their feet without having to
do a thing.
The sights and sounds from Israel speak
for themselves. You can understand why Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah
said last week that "the Israelis now admit that this [the protests on
Monday] is the worst day in the history of the Zionist entity, and the
meaning is that Israel has embarked on a path, God willing, of collapse,
fragmentation, and doom."
When Nasrallah rejoices with his friends
in Tehran and Gaza, Israel should be concerned. No one should have any
illusions as to what he really wants, and we must also remember what he
said several years ago: "We don't want to fight, nor destroy or throw
anyone to the sea. We only tell the Israelis in the most civilized way
that they must board planes or ships and return to where they have come
from. Only Jews who lived in Palestine before the arrival of Zionists
could live there; but the invaders, the occupiers, and the settlers who
arrived from all over the world – must go."
Nasrallah has already read the lay of
the land wrong when in 2000, after Israel's withdrawal from Southern
Lebanon, he described Israel as a spider's cobweb. But Nasrallah, just
like Yasser Arafat, soon discovered – in the Second Intifada and the
Second Lebanon War – that underestimating Israel's unity, stamina and
prowess is at one's own peril.
Perhaps that is why, according to
Iranian sources, the consultations between Tehran, Beirut, and Gaza
ended with a decision not to exploit Israel's weakness but to let it get
bogged down in its own quagmire, which has affected the IDF's combat
worthiness. This decision stems from the fear that if Hezbollah or Hamas
initiate hostilities, this will save Israel from itself and force
Israelis to put their differences aside and unite in the face of the
external threat.
But relying on Nasrallah's good judgment
is not easy. He is itching for something that would remind people that
he is alive and win him brownie points with his master in Tehran, he
could eventually repeat his mistakes by provoking Israel. Namely, he
might escalate his ongoing provocations along the border with the
assumption, or rather hope, that Israel will not be tempted to respond
and trigger an all-out conflagration. Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and
possibly Hamas, have been subscribing to the same modus operandi.
It is interesting that the rest of the
Arab world has been following what has been unfolding in Israel with
great interest, but it harbors no hope or illusions, nor does it show
any schadenfreude or sense of victory. After all, the Arab regimes with
which Israel has signed agreements want a strong Israel that can cater
to their security needs and predicaments. Apart from that, they don't
want domestic Arab forces to take inspiration from the Israelis and
start rallying against the regime. But for the actors in the resistance
axis, this is very different. More flare-ups involving them are just a
matter of time, and deterrence has to be maintained. That is why Israel
should choose the timing and theater of the conflagration, rather than
let Nasrallah and his partners drag it once again into hostilities at
times that are inconvenient. In other words, it is time to hit
Nasrallah, and the sooner the better.
But these are no ordinary days in
Israel, and to paraphrase Henry Kissinger's famous words, Israel doesn't
have a foreign policy or national security policy, only domestic
politics. Nasrallah will continue to enjoy every moment and exploit the
weakness exhibited by Israel. He will eventually get what he deserves
from Israel, but unfortunately only after we pay an unnecessarily high
price in order to get to that point.
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