Is he the next leader of Hamas in Gaza?
Ruthless, politically seasoned, and a disciple of Ahmed Yassin, Tawfiq Abu Naim, a close associate of Yahya Sinwar, hinted at the October 7 massacre months before it happened. Now, with most of Hamas leadership eliminated, he is in a prime position to become its next leader in Gaza. His first major test is already underway.
Shachar Kleiman
Israel Hayom
Oct 18, 2025
On September 15, 2023, less than a month before the October 7 massacre, a Hamas rally took place in al-Bureij camp. Hundreds of people came to the event held for terrorists in Israeli prisons. The keynote speaker was a close associate of Hamas leadership in Gaza and one of the most powerful men in the Strip. A Palestinian of Bedouin origin, large-bodied with a trimmed white beard. Someone who two years later would find himself in a launching position to become the new ruler of the Gaza Strip.
"Palestinian resistance places prisoners at the top of our priorities," he hinted in his speech. "This mass rally comes to support the prisoners held in the prisons of the Zionist occupation, and to send a message that the release of our prisoners is only a matter of time."
More than two years have passed. In three hostage release deals involving 255 captives, approximately 4,000 prisoners were freed. Following the war, thousands of terrorists were arrested, and ultimately, approximately 10,000 security detainees and prisoners sit in Israeli prisons. On one hand, the wholesale release of terrorists answered one of the central objectives of the attack. On the other hand, the failure to release four senior prisoners (Ibrahim Hamed, Hassan Salameh, Abdullah Barghouti, and Abbas al-Sayyid) left Hamas with a sense of missed opportunity. On the face of it, these were people who could have easily replaced Sinwar. And yet, they were not the only ones.
The speaker was Tawfiq Abu Naim (63), a native of al-Bureij camp and one of those released in the Gilad Shalit deal in 2011. Like other figures in Hamas, Naim grew up in the camp to which his family fled from the Beersheba area in the War of Independence. He previously testified to a French doctor who interviewed him that he remembers the Six-Day War from his childhood, as well as the activity of IDF fighters in the camp's houses. When he matured, he studied at the Islamic University in Gaza City and completed a bachelor's degree in theology (he later also completed a doctorate). There, he apparently first met Yahya Sinwar. In 1983, he joined the local cell of the Muslim Brotherhood movement and was one of the students of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.
Hamas chief Ismail Haniya visiting Tawfiq Abu Naim, director general of the internal security forces, at a hospital in Gaza City after he was wounded in a car bombing in October 2017.
Together with Sinwar and Rawhi Mushtaha, Abu Naim joined the "al-Majd" mechanism – a unit for murdering "collaborators." The horrific acts they carried out characterized Hamas' beginnings as an active terror organization, not just an Islamic preaching organization. In recent months, Hamas has returned to that same pattern of activity. Its operatives are busy in a frenzy pursuing "traitors from within," who are executed or undergo public humiliations. In 1989, such murder acts led Tawfiq Abu Naim to life imprisonment. In prison, he became one of the prominent leaders and learned Hebrew thoroughly. There, his connection with Sinwar tightened. They tried to escape from prison together, without success.
Twenty years later, he returned to Gaza. Abu Naim served in several administrative positions in Hamas' government, which were related to handling files for families of killed terrorists and prisoners. One of his roles was managing the absorption of Palestinians who left Syria during the civil war. Some of them were integrated into Hamas' "military wing." Another role, in which he served for some time, was coordination with other terror organizations. A few short years passed before he was appointed to one of the most senior positions in Hamas.
What was formerly "al-Majd" became in the Sinwar era an all-powerful body. The Strip was managed under the watchful eyes of the police, internal security mechanisms, and the general security apparatus. All of these were designed to thwart any intelligence breach, however small. Abu Naim was appointed to the office that was responsible for these mechanisms a decade ago. His missions included strengthening the policing arms, suppressing political protests with an iron fist, and neutralizing groups that operated under Islamic State inspiration.
"I was illegally kidnapped and underwent physical and psychological torture in a small cell for five days in May 2020. This was done by order of several senior figures in the movement (Hamas) who are identified with armed action in Gaza," a Palestinian journalist in exile testified about the mechanism's activity. "It was following an investigation I conducted to expose several corrupt people in philanthropic work. It turned out that one of them was a senior figure in Islamic Jihad who was extorting a woman." The journalist, needless to say, fled from Gaza after being accused of treason.
At that time, Abu Naim cultivated relationships with senior figures in Egyptian intelligence, including with Ahmed Abd al-Khaleq, head of the Palestinian portfolio. Through him, coordination was managed for establishing positions along the Gaza-Sinai border to make things harder for Salafi groups in the peninsula. The operations he managed against groups in the Strip earned him considerable points in Cairo but created new enemies for him. After all, some of the Salafi activists were relatives of Hamas operatives.
It seems no one was surprised when, in 2017, a Salafi activist planted an explosive device in Abu Naim's vehicle. The device exploded during a tour in Nuseirat camp, which left him moderately wounded. Despite this, he continued in his role until 2021, when he was replaced by Nasser Muslah, another senior figure in the organization who was not eliminated. The reason: Abu Naim's desire to run in elections for the Palestinian Authority's legislative council on behalf of Hamas.
Despite his promises, Abu Mazen ultimately preferred to postpone the elections to an unknown date. In practice, they were canceled. In any case, it was a sign that on the eve of war, Abu Naim was in the process of integrating into Hamas' "political bureau" – the supreme decision-making body. Meanwhile, Abu Naim returned to the role of chairman of the board of directors of a Hamas association called "Wa'ad" (promise), which deals with affairs of terrorists in prisons, including those who were released. He had already filled this role after his release from prison.
In an interview in March 2023 with the newspaper Filastin, he warned that "the coming days will be decisive," while threatening to escalate the protest in Israeli prisons due to worsening conditions. "The prisoners' entry into an open hunger strike, especially during the month of Ramadan, will ignite the situation inside the prisons and threaten an explosion," Abu Naim said at that time. After the October 7 attack broke out, he went underground, like other senior figures, and did not appear in even a single media interview.
Hamas' internal mechanisms suffered a severe blow during the war. More than 31 senior figures and commanders were eliminated by Israel. During a long series of strikes, those killed included Hamas police chief Mohammed Salah and his deputy, station commanders, department heads, head of the "Sahm" unit for pursuing collaborators, head of the operations department Fayeq al-Mabhouh, Sami Odeh, who headed the "general security," and Interior Minister Mahmoud Marzouq. More than 700 Hamas policemen were killed in the war, but on the eve of the war, the mechanism included at least 10,000 operatives. This means that even after the blow it sustained, Hamas preserved the most critical arm of all for its rule. To this, of course, are added the military wing terrorists.
The prevailing assessment is that Abu Naim, like other senior figures in the mechanisms, was called to serve again in key Hamas positions, against the background of the growing hole in the leadership apex and the economic crisis. For example, from the political bureau in Gaza remains Mahmoud al-Zahar, who is at an advanced age, and is the person responsible for the women's portfolio. The rest were killed in the war or are currently staying abroad in exile. The most senior among them is Khalil al-Hayya, who carries the empty title "Hamas leader in Gaza."
Now, together with senior figures from the "military wing," Abu Naim will be deeply involved in shaping the day after the war in Gaza. Given his greater political experience than the wing heads, Izz al-Din al-Haddad and Ra'ad Saad, Abu Naim could emerge as a key figure pulling strings behind the scenes, even if a technocratic administrative committee is established. Palestinian sources, incidentally, do not rule out cooperation with Hamas on the day after, despite President Donald Trump's plan. Abu Naim's roots in the Muslim Brotherhood movement can only benefit him when it comes to relations with Turkey and Qatar – two countries belonging to the emerging Islamist axis.
The murderous mechanism he built has grown and expanded. Hamas is now exploiting the policing mechanisms built in Abu Naim's days as part of its pursuit of clans suspected of cooperation with Israel. Some of the mechanisms took on new forms and different names, but the principle remained clear – to instill terror in the population through show trials that were held even at the height of the war.
This week, exchanges of fire erupted in the streets of the Sabra neighborhood. Hamas claimed in its statements that it overcame a "local militia." Despite commentators' desire to rush to crown the relationship with the clans as a "complete failure," it is important to note that in the specific case of the Durmush clan, that "militia," the effort did not really ripen. The initial contacts with the group went nowhere, even at the beginning of the war. This was after Hamas murdered the clan head. Additionally, Palestinian sources are not at all certain how much the conflict is related to Israel. After all, clan members themselves were killed in IDF strikes and are involved in aid theft and terror activity.
"Hamas severed contact with the Durmush clan after the recent clashes in Sabra erupted, but the dispute is not new. Similar confrontations erupted in 2007, when Hamas accused several clan members of robbery and security cooperation with 'foreign elements,'" network activist Hamza al-Masri told Arab media. "Hamas turned a blind eye in recent months to bakeries, gangs, and individuals who were involved in stealing humanitarian aid, but now it has returned to using force against specific groups." Nevertheless, Hamas paid a heavy price in the attack, which reflected its weakness. Already at the beginning of the confrontation, the son of Imad Aql, a Nukhba terrorist, was shot to death. Subsequently, the attack commander, who was a relative of Izz al-Din al-Haddad, was killed. The Durmush clan, for their part, rejects accusations of cooperation with Israel.
Currently, the groups whose cooperation with Israel was more significant are standing strong. Ashraf al-Mansi, who holds a force of dozens of gunmen in the Beit Lahia area, declared this week that there is no substance to rumors that his operatives were arrested by Hamas: "Our operatives are in the Gaza Strip. We tell you that we are in good condition and stronger than ever, thanks to Allah. We in the Popular Army, northern forces, emphasize the following points regarding rumors from the Hamas civil war trumpets: First, what is being spread in Hamas media regarding the arrest and killing of our operatives during confrontations between us is baseless news that has no connection to reality.
"Second, our forces are in good condition and they continue their national and moral duty in serving our people. Third, we warn against spreading these rumors, which aim only to stir civil war, harm the home front, and spread chaos among our people in Gaza. Fourth, we emphasize that our forces operate in the northern Strip, and thanks to Allah, we control several areas. Fifth, we warn any military element belonging to Hamas from approaching our control areas. We will treat them as Hamas treated our operatives. Sixth, our forces are fully prepared to ensure the safe return of residents. We will also emphasize that there is no Hamas control in the northern Gaza Strip."
Similar messages came from Hossam al-Astal in eastern Khan Younis and Yasser Abu Shabab in eastern Rafah. Despite the wave of rumors from channels identified with Hamas, which included claims of sieges and numerous arrests, it appears the confrontation has not yet reached that stage. Among Abu Shabab's popular forces, they emphasize every day that his condition is good and he continues activity as usual.
"Hamas thinks it can silence people, intimidate people, and remain forever," al-Astal, a former intelligence officer in the Palestinian Authority, made clear this week. "It forgot that peoples do not die, and that this fear has a short life. Hamas thinks it is the owner of Gaza, but Gaza is greater than a faction and more honored than blood merchants. We are a generation that will return Gaza to life." He claimed: "These are not words on paper and not slogans. We are holding firm with determination – today and tomorrow, even more so. We will not accept anyone who treats us as a faction or who sells our future to illusions."
Nevertheless, these armed forces are beyond the yellow withdrawal line in Trump's plan. The real test will begin in the second stage of the outline, when an international force is deployed in Gaza to enforce the ceasefire. On that day, the test of Tawfiq Abu Naim and the senior figures from the "military wing" who survived will also take place. Will they succeed in repeating past precedents and prove that Gaza has only one landlord? Will they be blocked by forces more trained and equipped than the clans they have dealt with until now? The questions will be clarified in the near future, together with the great unknown: where is Israel headed?
No comments:
Post a Comment