Understanding Abbas’s appointment of Rawhi Fattouh as his successor
Mahmoud Abbas’s choice of Fattouh as his interim replacement was not the positive appointment of a successor, but rather Abbas finally imposing the PLO on the Palestinian Authority.
By Lt. Col. (res.) Maurice Hirsch
JNS
Dec 9, 2024
Rawhi Fattouh (R), the designated temporary replacement for Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.
The decision of 89-year-old Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas to issue a “constitutional declaration” appointing Rawhi Fattouh, the chairman of the Palestinian National Council (PNC), to “temporarily serve as P.A. president pending the holding of presidential elections” signifies, in essence, the final nail in the coffin of the Palestinian Authority.
While intentionally worded misleadingly, the so-called “constitutional declaration” is the latest in a series of decisions made by Abbas over the last six years, all intended to replace the P.A. bodies with those of the Palestine Liberation Organization, over which Abbas and his Fatah party have complete dominance.
The P.A. was created under the Oslo Accords, which provided that the P.A. would have two central governance bodies—the P.A. chairman (president) and the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), which would function as the P.A. parliament. After its creation, the P.A. enacted legislation, mostly mirroring the provisions of the Accords, for the election of these two functionaries. In theory, the P.A. laws provided that the chairman would be elected for a four-year term, after which the incumbent could run for a second and final term. Elections for the PLC were also to be held every four years.
P.A. law aside, elections for the position of P.A. chairman have only been held twice in the last 30 years. Yasser Arafat won the first election, held in 1996, and stayed in the position, without further elections, until he died in 2004. Abbas won the second election, held in 2005, and has stayed in his position, without holding new elections, to this day.
The PLC suffered a similar fate. The first elections for the PLC were held in 1996, with Fatah, the party of Arafat and later Abbas, winning the majority of seats. The PLC elected in 1996 continued to function until 2005. The second PLC elections were held in 2006. Despite employing several different tactics and receiving substantial U.S. support, Abbas’s Fatah lost the elections, with its rival, Hamas, the internationally-designated terror organization that led the Oct. 7, 2023, massacre, winning 74 of the 132 PLC seats.
Following the 2006 elections, Hamas, then led by Ismail Haniyeh, appointed Abdel-Aziz Dweik as Speaker of the PLC and formed the P.A. government. After Israel and the international community refused to continue funding the P.A., under growing pressure, in early 2007 Abbas deposed the Hamas government. Initially, Abbas replaced it with a so-called “technocrat government,” which soon thereafter morphed into a Fatah-led government.
In June 2007, responding to Abbas’s move, Hamas violently seized control of the Gaza Strip. Since then, until the Oct. 7 massacre, Hamas dominated the Gaza Strip, while Abbas and his periodically changing Fatah governments ruled the areas under P.A. control in Judea and Samaria.
After the rift, and partly due to the arrest of many Hamas members of the PLC following a June 2006 raid from Gaza into Israel, during which terrorists killed several people and kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, the PLC ceased to function.
This time following P.A. law, in the absence of a functioning PLC Abbas assumed all the legislative powers of the PLC and started issuing “Laws by Decree.” In Gaza, Hamas issued laws of its own. While the PLC had ceased to function, it was never officially disbanded.
In late 2018, Abbas decided to formally dissolve the 2006-elected PLC. He did so to avoid Hamas again seizing control of the P.A., without ever holding elections. The fear arose since P.A. law provided that if the P.A. chairman died or became incapacitated, he would automatically be replaced by the Speaker of the Parliament who, at the time, was still Abdel-Aziz Dweik. Abbas sought to prevent this automatic function of P.A. law, in the fear that once Hamas/Dweik assumed his “temporary” position, he too would never step down and never call the elections required.
Before dissolving the PLC, Abbas promoted a structural change in the PLO that would grant him enhanced control.
To facilitate his control over the PLO, in May 2018, Abbas ensured that the PNC transferred its powers to a much smaller and more easily dominated Palestinian Central Committee (PCC). The PNC is the legislative institution of the PLO, that almost never convened due to its size and the geographical dispersion of its members.
Following the transfer of power from the PNC, in February 2022, Abbas then pushed to elect Rawhi Fattouh as the Speaker of the PNC and promoted a decision in the PCC ordering the PLO Executive Committee to reformulate the institutions of the P.A.
Having now merged the P.A. institutions into the PLO structure and replaced the PLC with the PNC, Abbas’s choice of Fattouh as his interim replacement was not the positive appointment of a successor, but rather Abbas finally imposing the PLO on the P.A.
To avoid openly saying that Abbas had dismantled the P.A.’s electoral and governing mechanisms, as designated by the Oslo Accords, and replaced them with the PLO, the wording of the announcement published by Wafa, the official media mouthpiece of the Palestinian leadership, was intentionally misleading: “President Abbas issued a constitutional declaration stipulating that should the post of P.A. President become vacant, the Chairman of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) shall temporarily serve as P.A. President pending the holding of presidential elections as per the Palestinian Elections Law.”
Using this wording, Abbas presented to the unfamiliar eye the ostensible reality that the PNC is somehow connected with the “Palestinian [i.e. P.A. – M.H.] Elections Law,” when in reality, no such connection exists.
Abbas’s choice of Fattouh as his interim replacement effectively allows him to temporarily placate all of the other Palestinian leaders, such as Hussein a-Sheikh, Mahmoud al-Aloul, Marwan Barghouti, Jibril Rajoub, Majed Faraj, Muhammad Dahlan, et al., who all see themselves, each for their own reason, as his replacement.
Originally published by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs.
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