The shattering of foreign-policy delusions
While some consider the proposed measures for Gaza as a non-starter, there are few other ideas on the table—certainly not for Mahmoud Abbas, whose Palestinian Authority lacks credibility.
By Sarah N. Stern
JNS
Feb 17, 2025
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is in the 20th year of what was supposed to have been a four-year term, postponing elections because he knows he won’t win. The most recent Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research poll showed Abbas with a mere 4% favorability rating.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke during his visit on Sunday with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem, stating that the president also “has been very bold about his view of what the future for Gaza should be—not the same tired ideas of the past, but something that is bold. And something that frankly took courage and vision in order to outline. And it might have shocked and surprised many. But what may not continue is the same cycle where we repeat over and over again, and wind up in the exact same place.”
He is correct that it “shocked and surprised” many. U.S. President Donald Trump’s approach to the Gaza Strip contrasts starkly with the long-standing foreign-policy strategies utilized by previous administrations since 1993. As most are aware, the president’s plan initially called for the relocation of approximately 2 million Gazans to Egypt and Jordan while the coastal enclave was redeveloped.
Since a peace treaty was signed between Egypt and Israel in 1979, Egyptian military aid has been foundational in foreign-policy circles. Cairo currently receives $2.1 billion in military and humanitarian assistance from the United States. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has called Trump’s proposal “an injustice that we cannot take part in” and has refused to travel to the United States until after an Arab summit is held in Cairo on Feb. 27.
Although King Abdullah of Jordan met last week at the White House with Trump and offered to take in 2,000 sick Palestinian children, he later issued a statement reiterating Jordan’s “steadfast position against the displacement of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. This is the unified Arab position. Rebuilding Gaza without displacing the Palestinians and addressing the dire humanitarian situation should be the priority for all.”
Jordan has signed a seven-year Memorandum of Understanding with the United States, where it receives a portion of $10.15 billion annually.
Trump has threatened to withdraw funding to Egypt and Jordan if they do not start to comply with his ideas.
Saudi Arabia rejected the Gaza plan and is spearheading Arab efforts to come up with an alternative plan for a “Riviera in the Middle East.” Riyadh has been wedded to the idea of Palestinian statehood and plans on spearheading a national Palestinian committee that would include the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. Resurrecting the P.A. when Hamas is clearly unpopular has been a default option for much of the international community.
The political landscape in Gaza, as well as Judea and Samaria, has often been characterized by a complex interplay between various factions vying for power and influence. At the forefront of this struggle is P.A. chief Mahmoud Abbas, now 89 years old, who finds himself in a position where his influence is steadily waning. He is in the 20th year of what was supposed to have been a four-year term, postponing elections because he knows he won’t win.
Abbas has named Rawhi Fattouh, head of the PLO Legislative Council, as a successor. If elections happened, Fattouh would replace him. According to Lt. Col. Maurice Hirsch of the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, “it is the announcement by Abu Mazen of the death of the P.A. … Rawhi Fattouh is now the head of the PLO Legislative Council. Palestinians do not have a good record of holding elections. Abbas has been a dictator, issuing what has been known as law by decree. By appointing Fattouh as his replacement he is saying the PLO has overtaken the P.A.”
The PLO Charter has never been amended. It is replete with articles noting “armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. This is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase.”
Yet the foreign-policy establishment keeps perpetually returning to propping up the P.A.
Since the Hamas-led terrorist attacks in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, the polling numbers for the P.A. have plummeted as opposed to Hamas. The most recent Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research poll showed Abbas with a mere 4% favorability rating. He is deemed “irrelevant” and “corrupt” by his own people.
We all remember when former Secretary of State John Kerry said in 2016 that “there will be no advanced and separate peace with the Arab world without the Palestinian process and Palestinian peace. Everybody needs to understand that. That is the hard reality.”
In contrast, both Trump administrations have recognized the minor significance of the P.A. and sagaciously have not made Palestinian statehood the keystone to resolving every dispute in the region. The Abraham Accords, signed on the White House Lawn in 2020 between Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain—later joined by Sudan and Morocco—indicated just how erroneous Kerry’s sentiments were. This shift in U.S. policy further marginalized Abbas, who had long relied on international support to bolster his position.
In complete ignorance of the Palestinian street, veteran foreign-policy “experts” cannot discard the failure of the “land for peace” paradigm and the emergence of a Palestinian state as the makeshift solution to all the problems in the region. They insist on seeing the internal struggles between Hamas and the P.A. as a binary relationship, devoid of other alternatives.
Prior to both Trump administrations, the P.A. has always inserted itself as “center stage” in the Mideast peace process. On Oct. 7, Hamas proved itself to many in the foreign-policy establishment to be primitive and barbaric, causing many in those circles to seek to elevate the P.A. Yet the P.A. continues to incite its people towards violence and has thrust aside each peace proposal with rejection and reverted to more violence.
In what can only be called a “grand deception,” Abbas and his appointee are kicking and screaming for relevance. Last week, the P.A. announced that it was going to stop its longtime “pay for slay” program that rewards murderers of Israelis. This program incentivizes violence against Jews by offering lavish rewards to the families of “martyrs” and prisoners—those who try but fail in their attempts, some of whom were freed as part of the multiple phases of the hostage release deal.
Let’s not kid ourselves. Abbas isn’t planning to change anything. This was an obvious and transparent overture to Trump and is as fraudulent as a scammer selling tickets to the Super Bowl for $100. The analogy is fitting, considering the depth of distrust that has mired the P.A. His increasingly desperate measures to regain some semblance of clout and credibility are seen by many as too little, too late. The political landscape is shifting dramatically, and the P.A.’s attempts to maintain its relevance are being met with skepticism and outright dismissal, both domestically and internationally.
Yet because of a supreme failure of the imagination, many in our foreign-policy circles simply seem to return to the same tired, failed policy paradigm.
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