IDF’s Oct. 7 probes show it misread Hamas for years, left southern Israel utterly vulnerable
Investigations detail military’s decade-long ‘misperception’ of Hamas, its refusal to recognize the imminent invasion even in the last few hours, and the chaos that catastrophically slowed the fightback on the day
The Israel Defense Forces on Thursday presented its top-level investigations into the military’s failures during the lead-up to the Hamas terror group’s October 7, 2023, onslaught, and on the day itself.
Some 5,000 Hamas-led terrorists from the Gaza Strip burst into southern Israel on October 7, 2023, carrying out a murderous rampage of unprecedented intensity and breadth. The IDF struggled to mount a response, its own probes now specify, with bases closest to the border overrun and the chain of command broken amid the chaos.
The attack claimed the lives of some 1,200 people in Israel, with another 251 people kidnapped and much of the area devastated. Most victims were civilians.
The material released by the IDF underlines the colossal failure for years ahead of Hamas’s invasion, in the final hours before it, and in the course of the terror group’s slaughter and abductions. It was only recognized months after the invasion and slaughter that the military’s Gaza Division, the regional unit responsible for the Strip and for protecting southern Israel, was “defeated” for several hours. The chaos and confusion catastrophically slowed the fightback on the day.
The IDF details intelligence material that was insistently misinterpreted over the years; the military’s overreliance on having an early warning to prepare its defenses; the degree to which troops were massively outnumbered by the invading terrorists; and the failure to understand what Hamas was doing during the attack.
The probes at the General Staff level are focused on four main topics:
The development of the IDF’s perception of Gaza over the past decade
The “perception” probe found that the IDF believed, prior to the October 7 onslaught, that the Hamas terror group in Gaza did not pose a significant threat to Israel, that it was uninterested in a large-scale war, that its tunnel networks had been significantly degraded, and that any cross-border threat would be thwarted by Israel’s high-tech border fence.
The investigation highlighted a widening gap between the IDF’s perceptions of Hamas, and what the terror group was doing in reality.
The IDF’s intelligence assessments of Hamas from 2014 until the outbreak of the war
The “intelligence assessments” investigation found that the Military Intelligence Directorate received information and plans outlining Hamas’s intent to launch a wide-scale attack against Israel over a period of several years, but dismissed the plans as unrealistic and unfeasible.
Instead, the Military Intelligence Directorate falsely assumed that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was a pragmatist who was not seeking a major escalation with Israel, and that the terror group viewed its 2021 war with Israel as a failure and was focusing its capabilities on rocket fire, and not a ground invasion.
As part of its investigations into its failures during the lead-up to the Hamas terror group’s October 7, 2023, onslaught, the IDF has now determined that Hamas had decided in April 2022 to launch such an attack. By September 2022, the terror group was at 85 percent readiness. And it decided in May 2023 to launch the assault on October 7.
The intelligence and decision-making process on the eve of October 7
The investigation into the decision-making process made by top officials on the eve of the attack found that the IDF identified five signs of unusual Hamas activity the night before the terror group’s October 7 onslaught, but believed they did not indicate an imminent attack.
This investigation also found that the IDF’s conduct, decision-making, and intelligence assessments on the night between October 6 and 7 were based on the result of years of false assessments about Hamas.
As a result, intelligence officials on all levels failed to provide a warning for what would come.
The command and control and orders given during battles between October 7 and 10
Finally, the last investigation topic, focusing on the battles on October 7 and the following days, found out only in hindsight the IDF’s Gaza Division was defeated for several hours that day.
As a result of not realizing in real-time that the Gaza Division had fallen, the General Staff did not understand the severity of the attack and failed to put together an accurate picture of the operational situation, which became a major challenge during the efforts to block the attack.
The battles investigation found that the IDF failed to protect Israeli civilians and was not ready for a wide-scale surprise attack.
Investigations do not deal with political leadership
The probes were aimed at drawing operational conclusions for the IDF and did not look into the policies of the political leadership, thereby avoiding a fight with government leaders, who have insisted that investigations must wait until after the end of the war against Hamas.
The investigations — conducted by units seen as having had a role in the failure to notice Hamas preparations or adequately ready themselves for the terror group’s onslaught — were carried out concurrently amid the war.
Thousands of hours were spent by officers on the investigations — collecting material, conducting interviews, and compiling the information.
In addition to the four main topics, the IDF investigated 41 separate battles and major incidents that took place during the October 7 attack.
The IDF has also set up a website (Hebrew link) where the findings will be publicly available after they are presented.
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