IDF or CENTCOM? Who runs the show in Israel's military
Senior official visits, joint strategy meetings, intelligence exchange, and operational cooperation – the involvement of the American military in the IDF has never been greater. "It's really as if the IDF has two Chiefs of Staff," a former senior Israeli military official says.
On Monday, American General Charles Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, participated in a tour of the Israel-Lebanon border. Although this is only the second time Brown, the highest-ranking officer in the US armed forces, has visited Israel, he seemed to feel at home here. Brown's host was IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi. In photos distributed by the IDF Spokesperson's Unit, the two can be seen flying comfortably in a helicopter, listening together to a briefing in the northern command operations room, and sitting naturally side by side at the head of the General Staff table. "It's almost as if the IDF has two chiefs of staff," says a former senior military official.
The IDF does indeed have only one chief of staff, but Brown's presence in Israel, and the way he was received here, is a clear expression of the deep, unprecedented military cooperation between Israel and the United States. "A military coalition without a military coalition," is how a source in the defense establishment defines it.
In the past three weeks, in the shadow of the alert for the Iranian regime's response to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, this "coalition" has reached its peak. During this period, the United States Central Command, which oversees the Middle East region and is in daily contact with the IDF, has grown tenfold in terms of its force size: from a fighting force of 4,000 men in routine to about 40,000 fighters, with their equipment, including two aircraft carriers, a nuclear submarine, and hundreds of fighter and reconnaissance aircraft. "This time," says a source in the Defense Ministry, "America has gone out of its way for us."
The reason for CENTCOM's massive buildup, senior defense and political officials agree, is solely related to Iran. "They didn't come here for Hezbollah," as one of them puts it. The American declarations, from President Joe Biden downwards, aimed at deterring Iran from attacking, were accompanied by operational moves on the ground, which caused Israel's greatest enemy to hesitate. And so, while the ayatollahs calculate their steps, the IDF turned its attention to Lebanon.
Security and political sources in Israel claim this week that the American deterrence had a decisive contribution to halting the Iranian response, and that it allowed the IDF to concentrate its efforts on the northern front, where a successful preemptive strike against Hezbollah's missile and rocket launchers was carried out on Sunday. According to the sources, the Americans were updated about the attack in Lebanon only shortly before the event, mainly so they could prepare to defend their many forces deployed in the area, and did not participate in it themselves.
"We and the Americans are coordinated," says Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaacov Ayish, former military attaché in Washington, "but it's not that we ask them for permission for every offensive action we take. We update them so they understand the significance of our moves, and take appropriate steps to protect themselves and us. By the way, they don't update us on everything either."
Ayish's words illustrate well the delicate fabric of relations between senior IDF officials and CENTCOM, two armies that have been working side by side in recent years and have developed a unique shared language and brotherhood in arms. However, this brotherhood has limits. For example, IDF officers meeting with senior CENTCOM officials come to these meetings pre-briefed on the information they can share – and vice versa. "It's a complex relationship, with checks and balances, a lot of discretion, and also personal friendships built over years and many joint exercises," says a former senior IDF official who worked extensively with the US military. "This is the infrastructure that enables long-term cooperation."
There's no doubt about the advantages Israel receives from this infrastructure. "Israel is strong and protects itself," Halevi said during the joint tour with Brown this week. "Nevertheless, it's always good to have a strong ally by our side." We saw a resounding testament to this in the "night of missiles" in April when Iran launched a barrage of over 300 drones and missiles toward Israel, which was thwarted in a brilliant air operation led jointly by the IDF and CENTCOM.
However, the partnership with CENTCOM, like any partnership, also has disadvantages. "When the US president sends Brown here, he creates control and commitment," says a former senior IDF officer who knows the political and strategic arena well. "He forces the IDF to update him, he creates close monitoring of the plans, and he understands what the mood is here. In the end, we're talking about a superpower whose goal is control, and it thinks about its own interests. In this relationship, the chief of staff gains, but also loses some of his independence. He understands that there are things he can't do because the Americans are around, and that if we disobey those who are physically protecting us, we'll be in serious trouble."
Unprecedented power
On Monday, August 12, IDF spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari stood in front of the cameras. He did so following persistent rumors circulating in Israel that Iran was planning to attack in the coming hours. Hagari carried a reassuring message for the tense Israeli public, but his words that evening were also directed at another target audience. "We are monitoring what's happening specifically against Iran with all our capabilities," he said, "We are also not monitoring alone, but with the US and with additional partners."
It was no coincidence that Hagari waved the metaphorical American baseball bat several times during his statement. On that tense day, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced that he had ordered the nuclear submarine USS Georgia to be sent to the Middle East, as part of the defense array against Iran. The Georgia joined the battle group of the aircraft carrier Lincoln, which includes destroyers, missile ships, and four fighter squadrons, already on its way to the area. Here, the aircraft carrier Roosevelt awaited it, including more than 4,000 marines and sailors, deployed in combat formation alongside 12 additional warships.
If anyone had any doubt about America's intentions, Biden came and expressed them in his own voice. The day before Hagari's statement, Biden was caught leaving a church in his hometown of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware. When asked what his message to Iran was, the president responded with one word that has become associated with him: "Don't."
The aircraft carrier Lincoln finally reached its destination on Aug. 22 and was subordinated to CENTCOM. Two days later, Brown arrived for a surprise visit to the Middle East, which included meetings in Jordan and Egypt. It seems this was the last piece in the puzzle that the IDF was waiting to complete. The next day, Aug. 25, about 100 Air Force planes took off for the strike in Lebanon.
Middle Eastern English
The American buildup in the region was done in full coordination with the IDF. On Aug. 9, General Michael Kurilla, commander of the Central Command, arrived in Israel for the second time in a week for a meeting with Halevi. In parallel, meetings were held between the heads of IDF branches and some of the General Staff with their counterparts in CENTCOM. The deputy chief of staff and coordinator of the connection with CENTCOM, Israeli Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Amir Baram, also met with his American counterpart for coordination talks and intelligence updates. These numerous meetings were coordinated by the Tevel Division in the IDF's strategy department, responsible for liaising with foreign armies. "There's a close operational dialogue here," says a senior military source, "they don't just throw ships in the sea and planes in the air for no reason."
From the meetings between the generals and admirals, operational guidelines flowed to the joint working groups, at the level of brigadier generals and colonels, who worked together to formulate action plans and divide areas of responsibility. The conversations were held remotely, using encrypted video systems, and sometimes face-to-face, in joint operations rooms. These Israeli-American meetings, says a source who participated in them, are conducted as equals, in an open manner and without unnecessary formalities of respect. And yes, sometimes there are disagreements that escalate into shouting.
The conversations between IDF officers and CENTCOM are conducted, of course, only in English. "But it's an English that understands the Middle East," says a source involved in these conversations, "CENTCOM is the partner that's most comfortable to work with. Suddenly you discover that there's someone else is also studying Iran, who knows how the region operates. It's like adding another body to the IDF, expanding its capabilities basket." CENTCOM, by the way, also serves as a liaison body to other armies in the region, those that operate in lockstep with Israel and the US but do not maintain direct connections with the IDF.
"Cooperation with CENTCOM is a strategic asset for Israel," says former head of IDF Military Intelligence, Maj. General (ret.) Amos Yadlin. "Think about it: the US has only seven aircraft carrier battle groups in total, of which only three or four are operational at any given time. In other words, half of the active American aircraft carriers are currently in our region. There's no doubt that this is part of the reasons why the Iranians decided to delay, and perhaps even cancel, their attack. From this perspective, it's very important that they don't see only Israel facing them, but also the US."
A Defense Ministry source adds, "Putting another aircraft carrier here is a significant statement to the region. America knows how to convey its messages well. The Americans have superpower capabilities, and it's good that they're on our side."
However, the US not only has superpower capabilities but also superpower interests. Alongside the military meetings, diplomatic contacts were also held in recent weeks to discuss these interests. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke on the phone with Biden and met with Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who also met with Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, who in turn maintained an open channel with Austin. The defense minister's office also spoke with Brett McGurk, the National Security Council's envoy to the Middle East, and with Amos Hochstein, who was in charge of relations with Lebanon on behalf of the administration.
What was sewn in these diplomatic talks trickled down to the military level. Kurilla, who reports directly to Biden, received his instructions from the administration in Washington. Halevi received his instructions from Jerusalem. According to sources familiar with the details, one of the instructions that flowed from the Israeli political echelon to the IDF was to slightly reduce the response against Hezbollah from what was originally planned. "The Americans prefer the region to be quiet and without wars. That's the starting point," explains a security source, "but they also understand our need to defend ourselves. There's always an inherent tension within this system."
Air defense commander Brig. Gen. Ran Kochav, former spokesperson for the IDF said, "The United States of America has been giving a masterclass in strategy here in recent weeks. When they send aircraft carriers here, a nuclear submarine, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs arrives, Biden says 'don't' and everyone is busy explaining to the Iranians and Hezbollah that they should be careful, there's no doubt that it affects and deters, and to some extent helps to 'get them down from the tree'. But it's important to remember that the US is doing all this from its own interests – preventing a regional war. When Biden says 'don't' to Iran, he's also saying 'don't' to Israel."
According to Brig. Gen. (res.) Assaf Orion, senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, "The US is our closest partner, with shared values and a similar – but not identical view – of the problems – and of course differences in policy. The IDF and CENTCOM are each subordinate to a different government and serve a different policy. In some things, the interests are shared, and in others, they differ. The threats on our borders, for example, are much more severe in Israel's eyes than in the US's eyes. Our approach is more offensive, and the US is a large power that doesn't rush into conflicts. These are tensions that need to be managed."
When asked whether the IDF has to make concessions to adapt to CENTCOM's interests, Orion says, "In life, there are constraints. You can't tell the US 'put your credit card here and send half an army here, back me in the UN and help me with ammunition', without giving up something. Sometimes you need to argue about things, but in the end, what the US gives us on the military, security, and strategic level is priceless. When your current challenge is dealing with Iran on its way to nuclear weapons and with all the axis of resistance it has built around us, you understand that an anti-coalition of Israel must be part of the equation, and the US has a central role in the ability to form such a coalition. As Churchill said, there's only one thing worse than fighting with a coalition – fighting without a coalition."
When interests collide
We saw the Israeli-American coalition perform a virtuoso defense during the "night of missiles" in April, and in recent weeks, we've witnessed it projecting its strategic power. Even at the intelligence level, there's a close connection between the US and Israel, and according to some reports in the Israeli media, the US provided Israel with advance intelligence for the strike in Lebanon. However, on one issue, the two allies prefer to act completely separately: offense.
According to a security source, Israel tends not to update the US in advance about strikes it carries out, partly to leave the Americans room for denial. "We give them a warning, but not much in advance," the source says, "They know you're going to do something, but you don't confirm with them exactly how, how much, and why, just general lines. It's also convenient for them."
Yadlin, who, as mentioned above, is the former head of IDF Military Intelligence, added, "On the issue of defending the State of Israel, the Americans stand behind us one hundred percent. They less like our offensive initiatives, which in their view could deteriorate the Middle East into a regional war. The American strategic goal, in a global view, is de-escalation in the Middle East. From their perspective, there are two arenas with much higher priority – the Pacific arena against China and the European arena against Russia. Israel is an independent country and acts according to its interests, but it needs to take into account all the risks and try to minimize them. One of the risks is that the Americans won't give us the political Iron Dome and the logistical and operational support they provide us, as long as it's about direct defense of Israel."
Similarly, Kochav said, "The Americans came with all their might to the region under a defensive logic or idea, not to attack in Iran or Lebanon. An attack is a completely different opera. I don't see an American plane attacking in Lebanon, for example, in the foreseeable future. By the way, CENTCOM attacks in Yemen almost every week, but it operates in that arena separately from the IDF. Even when Israel bombed in Yemen, it did so independently, Israeli, blue and white. Although in coordination with the Americans, but without the involvement of their fighter jets."
Still, the friction between the IDF and CENTCOM, at the operational level, and even more so at the personal level, sometimes forces Israel to be flexible. Brig. Gen. (res.) Nitzan Nuriel, former head of the foreign relations division in the Operations Directorate and who was responsible for joint exercises with the US for years, illustrates this with a story.
"When preparations are made for joint exercises, dozens of American officers come to Israel, staying in hotels in Tel Aviv," he says. "On one occasion, during their stay in the country, Israel went out for a targeted raid in Gaza. The operation didn't require any coordination or update with the Americans, but on a personal level, those officers expect us to update them in advance about the assassination, because the response to it could endanger them. What happens when you update someone? They can tell you 'it doesn't suit me'. There's a slippery slope here, which isn't related to the operational world at all, but to the friendship and openness that exists between partners. The moment someone is your partner around the table, you automatically add restrictions on yourself."
Ayish agrees, "There's no cooperation that doesn't impose constraints on you. From the moment I need to consider another player, it's a constraint, even at the most basic technical level. Take, for example, the American forces currently in our area. When you build an attack plan for Lebanon and map out your electronic warfare actions, you might disrupt their radars and missile defense systems, which ultimately are supposed to serve you."
According to a former senior Israeli Air Force official, "In the end, the State of Israel is a sovereign and independent state, and it decides for itself how it defends itself. This is a principle that the Americans respect, even if they don't always like what we do. There are those who imagine that we need to get approvals from them. The answer is absolutely not. We act according to our needs where and when necessary, but because they're moving around in this area, certainly mechanisms need to exist to prevent friction. They're essential. In the end, you can find yourself in the same space, when they don't know about you and we don't know about them, and as a result, very bad things can happen. There's very important cooperation here, which has developed beautifully and progressed, and this doesn't contradict the fact that Israel reserves the right to defend itself."
When asked about the timing of notifying American counterparts prior to Israeli Air Force operations in Lebanon, like the one this week, the Air Force official explained that there's no fixed protocol.
IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, June 2024
"It's related to many components, so there's no definitive answer to this. It's completely clear that the American administration knew and also understood that Israel was going out to attack, but that doesn't mean they approved it. There are no pre-written rules stating that we notify them two days in advance of what we're about to do. Everything depends on context. But beyond that, remember that the Americans have a lot of forces deployed in the area, so they can identify movements that Israel is making. They know what's happening on the ground even without us telling them."
From EUCOM to CENTCOM
Until January 2021, military cooperation between Israel and the US was based on working relationships between the IDF and EUCOM, the Pentagon's European Command. Ahead of the signing of the Abraham Accords, the Americans decided on their own initiative to transfer Israel to CENTCOM's responsibility, a move that Israel welcomed with open arms and which opened up for the IDF the possibility of cooperating more closely not only with the Americans but also with the moderate countries in the region. Shortly after, Kurilla was appointed as CENTCOM commander, which deepened the relationships even further.
"Kurilla's personal contribution is dramatic," Kochav says. "He's very committed to this mission, he's very offensive, and his standing in the Pentagon, in Washington, and among the administration is very significant."
According to a source in the Defense Ministry, Kurilla "is a very pro-Israel figure, and he has an excellent relationship with Herzi and with the army in general."
Kurilla also went down for a tour of Kibbutz Nahal Oz and the nearby outpost, was deeply impacted by the atrocities Hamas committed there, and came out shocked. "Kurilla is fully aware of what happened on Oct. 7," a source who spoke with him recently says.
There's no doubt that this personal identification also contributes to the relationship between CENTCOM and the IDF. It adds to the phone calls that take place between Kurilla and Halevi, almost on a daily basis, and to CENTCOM commander's frequent visits to Israel, especially since the outbreak of the war. "The joke in the system," says a security source, "is that Kurilla needs to get his own office in the General Staff building. That's how consolidated CENTCOM and the IDF are."
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