In the wake of Sunday’s round of blows between Israel and Hezbollah,
both sides profess to be relatively satisfied. Hezbollah leader Hassan
Nasrallah essentially drew his bottom line in a speech on Sunday evening
when he announced that the operation was “over,” albeit while reserving
“the right” to strike again.
Some would define his speech as apologetic – designed to explain to
his domestic audience in Lebanon that Hezbollah had not permitted the
assassination by Israel of its military leader, Faud Shukr, to pass
unavenged, and that it had thus exacted a price from Israel. (Israel
killed Shukr in a strike in Beirut on July 30, three days after a
Hezbollah rocket killed 12 Israeli children in Majdal Shams on the Golan
Heights, in an attack for which Israel held Shukr responsible.)
Hezbollah’s ostensible attack on the Glilot base — which was not in
fact impacted — was depicted by Nasrallah as the main achievement of its
revenge assault, but with a very specific stress on that base being north of Tel Aviv.
His point, and this was for outside consumption, was that Hezbollah had
been careful not to fire directly on Tel Aviv, lest the symmetry
Nasrallah has himself previously drawn, whereby a strike on Beirut is
considered equivalent to a strike on Tel Aviv, would be used against
him.
But that was not the only cautious choice made by Nasrallah. It
appears that the organization considered firing precision missiles at
Glilot, home to the IDF’s Unit 8200 intelligence unit and to the
Mossad’s HQ.
The Hezbollah chief ultimately decided not to use this strategic
weapon for fear that the Israeli retaliation would be so forceful as to
start a far longer and more devastating conflict than the past 10 months
have seen.
Intent on avoiding this scenario, Hezbollah instead fired drones
toward Glilot, calculating that this would not open the floodgates.
After all, Hezbollah has been firing drones into Israel for the whole 10
months, so Nasrallah assessed that this would not be considered by
Israel as a cause for escalation. In the event, almost 20 drones were
destroyed, with none of them making it further south than Acre.
Rockets fired by Hezbollah from southern
Lebanon are intercepted by the Iron Dome air defense system over the
Upper Galilee region in northern Israel on August 23, 2024.
“Militarily, Hezbollah’s retaliation failed by every parameter: No
targeted military site was hit, Hezbollah lost many of its missile
setups in Israel’s preemptive strike, and it still hasn’t fully taken
stock of the damage we caused,” a senior military official told The
Times of Israel.
In this context, Israel would do well to avoid boasting. Nasrallah
knows full well what didn’t work for him, as his speech on the purported
achievements made clear. Irresponsible Israeli statements run the risk
of cornering Nasrallah and prompting him to strike again. Israel should
give him some room to take it all in; we have wisely used ambiguity in
the past as a means to end a round of fighting.
Israeli assessments suggest one of the reasons for Hezbollah’s
relatively diluted retaliation is internal tension in the wake of
Shukr’s assassination. He has been replaced as military chief by
Hezbollah’s former southern command chief, Ali Karki. And this
appointment has in turn created tension with two other senior officials:
operations chief Ibrahim Akil and Hezbollah’s head of security, who is
known as Mortada.
Fuad Shukr, Hezbollah’s most senior
military commander (left), who was killed in an Israeli strike on Beirut
on July 30, 2024, is seen with Hassan Nasrallah (right) in an undated
photo.
Shukr was able to navigate between these two centers of power and
direct the organization according to Nasrallah’s will. In Shukr’s
absence, Nasrallah, hitherto focused on setting policy, has been forced
to step in. The rivals are competing for closeness to Nasrallah, and
that rivalry projects downward, impacting the management of the war in
the south. It is not inconceivable that one of Nasrallah’s
considerations for not firing precision missiles at Glilot was a lack of
faith in his senior officials.
The IDF’s preemptive attack in southern Lebanon on Sunday targeted
thousands of rocket launcher barrels and undoubtedly prevented a
significant part of Hezbollah’s planned retaliation, even though it had
already been significantly scaled back on Nasrallah’s orders.
Nasrallah was evidently worried by the fact that two rocket volleys
hit civilian communities – the town of Acre and moshav Manot – as
underlined by the claim in his speech that Hezbollah did not intend to
fire at civilians.
Again, his concern was about reverse symmetry — that Israel would
react with massive attacks on sensitive Hezbollah targets in the heart
of civilian populations. To date, it bears noting, Israel has minimized
such attacks.
The question now is where we go from here – and will Sunday’s fighting constitute a watershed moment in this war with Hezbollah?
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (2L),
Defense Minister Yoav Gallant (2R) and others at the ‘pit’ at the
military headquarters in Tel Aviv, early on August 25, 2024, as Israel
carried out a preemptive strike on Hezbollah targets.
The fact is that the IDF’s northern command, during the approval
phase of the plans for Sunday’s preemptive attack, proposed a far more
expansive assault, but the government limited it to southern Lebanon
only. While there were still strikes north of the Litani River, they
were of a nature designed to avoid pushing Hezbollah into a corner.
As long as Gaza is still considered Israel’s main front, and the one
that is drawing the majority of the IDF’s resources, a definitive
conflict in the north remains postponed. Even after the heaviest day of
fighting across the northern border, Israel evidently still prefers to
try to reach a diplomatic arrangement with Hezbollah without the need
for a ground operation in Lebanon.
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