After 10 months of fighting, many ask why
Hamas has not yet been destroyed and Israel’s war objectives have yet to
be fully realized.
At the beginning of the war, some in the
defense establishment and government sought to avoid a ground maneuver
in Gaza. Similar advice was offered by the American officials who
frequented Israel. There were several reasons for this hesitation,
primary among which were doubts regarding the ability of ground forces
to operate effectively in Gaza’s complex environment. While it took time
to make the decision to go ahead with the maneuver, once made, Israeli
forces acted decisively.
However, over time, the senior command
became hesitant in its use of force, imposing numerous limitations on
the advance of forces. It was as if they envisioned the campaign as a
large special operation and not a series of divisional attacks during
which it was necessary to maintain the principles of war, particularly
that of continuity. This resulted in frequent halts in operations,
especially in Rafah, partly due diplomatic pressures from the United
States that the political echelon was unable to withstand. However, lack
of professional resolve among the highest military ranks also
contributed to the unnecessary prolongation of the conflict.
Another factor prolonging the conflict—one
that is still in play—is the issue of humanitarian aid, which has two
aspects. The first is the scope of aid entering Gaza and the second is
how this aid is distributed. From the start, Israel faced intense
American pressure to transfer humanitarian aid and fuel to Gaza, despite
Washington’s knowledge that much of it would reach Hamas and enhance
its ability to survive in Gaza’s tunnels. The political echelon’s
inability to withstand this pressure undermined one of Israel’s key
leverage points to secure the return of the hostages and prolonged
Hamas’ military and civilian survivability.
Hamas’s control over humanitarian aid
gives it breathing room and maintains its influence and power among the
population. Some aid is diverted to the organization’s needs (food and
fuel), while the rest is distributed by it; Hamas uses the aid to
recruit new operatives (by supplying them with food) and to strengthen
its control over the Gaza Strip and its population. Moreover, the aid is
not distributed in a manner that aligns with the IDF’s operational
objectives, thus complicating efforts to evacuate civilians from areas
of conflict, such as northern Gaza, and hindering military operations.
The IDF’s hesitation in putting a stop to this by imposing partial and
temporary military rule or assuming responsibility for aid distribution
prolongs the war and hampers the IDF’s ability to achieve its
objectives.
Another factor contributing to the
prolonged conflict is the hostage issue. The IDF has acted cautiously
throughout the conflict and continues to do so to avoid harming the
hostages. Operational planning of the ground maneuver and the use of
firepower have been calculated to reduce the risk to them. This caution
likely resulted in missed operational opportunities and will likely
continue to influence the IDF’s conduct in Gaza.
A delay of some four months was also
caused by American and international pressure to avoid operations in
Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor along the Gaza-Egypt border. This
pressure was driven primarily by concerns over harm to civilians and
actions that could hinder potential hostage negotiations. However, it
now seems clear that these concerns were in fact an excuse for the
United States and elements in the international community to impose a
ceasefire on Israel. Precious time was lost before the IDF began
operations in this area under a format acceptable to Washington.
The IDF’s preparedness for the conflict in
Gaza was also inadequate, to say the least. This was manifested in
several areas, including force buildup. Over recent years, the IDF has
neglected its ground forces, particularly reserve units, due to a belief
that wars could be won with intelligence, remote firepower and advanced
technology operated by small units.
This perception led to a shift in
resources away from the ground forces and toward intelligence and
precision firepower. As a result, the IDF’s ground forces were cut,
armored brigades disbanded and the procurement of key combat platforms
(tanks and APCs) reduced. The artillery and engineering corps (primarily
heavy engineering equipment) crucial for ground operations in complex
areas like Gaza and Lebanon have also been cut back. Tens of thousands
of reservists were released from the IDF, and training for those who
remained was also significantly reduced.
The truth must be told: Some senior IDF
commanders failed to grasp the multi-front threat and consequently
failed to understand the importance of maintaining the readiness of
ground forces, particularly in the reserves.
These force buildup issues, coupled with a
lack of sufficient ground forces, are among the main reasons for the
difficulty in conducting simultaneous operations across multiple combat
zones in Gaza. The lack of civilian oversight by the political echelon
of the IDF’s force buildup also contributed to the army’s poor
preparedness.
Lack of preparedness in operational
planning exacerbated the force-buildup situation. This was evident in
two main areas: First, the IDF underestimated the threat posed by Hamas,
particularly its underground infrastructure and tunnel network. Second
(directly derived from the first) was the absence of operational plans
for a scenario like the one unfolding in Gaza—the full occupation of the
Gaza Strip and the destruction of Hamas.
For years, Gaza was considered a secondary
arena, with the General Staff focusing mainly on the northern front and
Iran at the expense of intelligence gathering, operational planning and
attention to Gaza. As a result, the IDF found itself scrambling to
formulate updated operational concepts and implement them during combat.
This neglect directly affected the duration of the conflict.
Finally, while the prolongation of the
conflict in Gaza is the result of multiple factors, the IDF’s
unwillingness to take over the distribution of humanitarian aid, as
required by international law, is the main reason currently preventing
the complete destruction of Hamas’s military and governmental
capabilities. The political echelon bears significant responsibility for
this, due to its inability or unwillingness to confront the military
and force it to take the necessary steps in the civilian sphere. Other
factors also contributed, as detailed in the article. Addressing these
issues in the civilian sphere is essential to completing the destruction
of Hamas’s military and governmental capabilities.
Originally published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.
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