Israel has never concealed its policy with regard to targeted assassinations and has never limited counterrorism operations to its own territory, reaching far and wide. This holds true for Hamas operatives in Malaysia and for Iranians in Syria.
By Yoav Limor
Israel Hayom
April 27, 2018
It was only natural that Hamas would blame Israel for the assassination of its drone scientist Fadi al-Batsh in Malaysia last week. The Gaza-based terrorist group claimed that the Jabaliya-born al-Batsh was nothing more than a preacher, but it soon became clear that his main pursuit was research and development for the manufacture of advanced weapons, mainly unmanned aerial vehicles, for Hamas.
Israel has never concealed its counterterrorism policy, neither with regard to the development of advanced weapons by terrorist organizations nor with regard to eliminating its enemies. Israel's counterterrorism campaign has never been limited to its own territory – although it has targeted dozens of terrorists, weapons experts and weapon production facilities in the Gaza Strip – and it has reached far and wide to disrupt the delivery of weapons to the coastal enclave and eliminate those involved in their manufacture and transport.
There is no shortage of examples, some familiar, such as Israeli Navy raids on ships carrying missiles and other weapons, and others more vague, such as foreign media reports linking Israel to a variety of missions targeting installations and individuals, such as the 2010 assassination of Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades co-founder Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai and the 2016 hit on Mohammed Alzoari, the head of Hamas' drone program, in Tunisia.
One can assume that there are other incidents that have remained unsolved or unpublished. It is not always in the injured party's interest to admit its ranks were compromised or that it has failed to defend its operatives, and it is not always in the injuring party's interest to expose its involvement and risk retaliation.
That is unlikely to happen in this incident. Israel has refrained from commenting on al-Batsh's assassination and Hamas is too weak and deterred to respond, not to mention that it has better reasons to fight Israel than a hit on one of its operatives overseas.
Therefore, the main issue of an assassination of this nature lies with the risk posed to those carrying it out.
As an operational theater, Malaysia has its advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it is a relatively hostile – and distant – Muslim country, making for a potentially complex extraction. On the other hand, it has relatively weak security services, a proliferation of foreigners that allow operatives to easily blend into a crowd, and a variety of ways to make a fast exit, by air or by sea.
Complex groundwork
Launching missions of this nature involves a complex approval process that begins with the Heads of the Intelligence Services Committee, which comprises the directors of the Mossad intelligence agency, Shin Bet security agency and Military Intelligence. It continues with meticulous intelligence-gathering on the intended target, and includes a lengthy series of discussions and approvals within the agency tasked with the mission and the political echelon.
The lessons of the past, mainly those learned from the botched attempt to eliminate Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal in Jordan in 1997, place particular importance on the site of a planned assassination: Al-Batsh had been due to leave Malaysia to attend a conference in Turkey and then travel to London. It is likely that whoever eliminated him wanted to avoid a confrontation with Turkey or with Britain, especially the latter, given that the U.K. is particularly sensitive to the issue in view of the recent attack on its soil against a former Russian spy. This made Malaysia, despite its shortcomings, a relatively convenient destination for this mission.
For the most part, the assassination itself is the least complex part of the operation. It is the groundwork leading up to it that is complicated. Gathering intelligence about the intended target can sometimes take years as it must include every minute detail about his routine, habits, places of residence and work and associates, so as to minimize collateral damage and the risk to the team carrying out the mission. It also includes researching the best place in which to strike and, of course, researching and preparing how to enter the country and leave it undetected, as well as outlining a contingency extraction plan.
Every intelligence organization deals with these issues prior to an operation of this kind, but it is likely that the Israeli concerns are much greater. No spy travels the world under their true identity, but the Americans, British and Russians can issue their operatives authentic passports using aliases. Israel, according to foreign media reports, has had to rely on foreign passports, meaning borrowed identities.
This is where the age of information and technology creates a new set of problems. The extensive coverage of Mabhouh's killers, as caught on the Dubai hotel's security cameras, made it clear that something had changed and that while pulling the trigger is pivotal to the success of a targeted assassination, it is not the only component of the mission that counts, certainly if Israel seeks to guarantee its operatives' safety and avoid diplomatic embarrassment.
The composite and later the photo of one of the suspects in al-Batsh's murder, released Wednesday by the Kuala Lumpur police, is unlikely to compromise any of the perpetrators. Contrary to the Malaysians' working assumption, they most likely left the country shortly after the assassination and have probably been lying low for days now.
Best laid threats
Israel is no stranger to targeted assassinations as a policy and one can even say it swears by them. No prime minister has ever missed an opportunity to say that Israel "will hunt down the enemy, anywhere, anytime." Some periods see more operations than others, mostly due to the nature of the individuals serving as prime minister and Mossad director, as well as the results of previous hits. Successes increase the intelligence services' appetite and failures bring planned operations to a halt.
The failed attempt on Mashaal and the scandal that followed Mabhouh's assassination resulted in a virtual hiatus for Kidon, the Mossad's black-ops unit. In contrast, the successful elimination of Hezbollah's iconic military commander Imad Mughniyeh in 2015, allegedly by Israel, led to a flurry of operations reportedly involving Israeli intelligence agents, including the elimination of several Iranian nuclear scientists.
Perception aside, these operations are few and far between, their odds are carefully assessed, and every step leading up to them is painstakingly scrutinized because of the substantial risks they involve and their volatile diplomatic potential.
For now, it seems Israel feels free to pursue this policy, especially toward Hamas. Targeted assassinations have a triple effect: They eliminate highly dangerous players, generate deterrence opposite the enemy, and send a clear message to everyone else that Israel is determined to uphold its red lines and will not hesitate to remove anyone or anything that poses a threat to its security.
The first two elements apply mostly to Hamas, as the group has lost a relatively rare weapons expert and has had to contend – once again – with the fact that its members and operations are transparent to Israel in Gaza and around the world. This will not make Hamas change its tactics or make it reconsider developing advanced weapons with which to threaten Israel, but the loss of a key player of al-Batsh's caliber is bound to give Hamas pause, as it will have to revise its operational methods.
The third element concerns Iran, especially since the confrontation between the Islamic republic and Israel is now being waged out in the open.
The message from the Malaysia incident is that Israel will not hesitate to target anyone who poses a threat. This is true for Hamas operatives in Malaysia and for the Iranians in Syria.
Still, Iran is not Hamas and fighting Tehran's nefarious intentions is exponentially more dangerous and complex. However, in the Middle East, threats alone can often prevent actions on the ground. Only a cockeyed optimist would believe this type of action could actually stop Iran, but it is safe to say that the message sent in Malaysia will resonate in Tehran.
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